{"id":114387,"date":"2011-05-28T17:18:00","date_gmt":"2011-05-28T17:18:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.mafr.fr\/actualites\/i-131-the-competition-authority-between-regulation-2\/"},"modified":"2026-09-22T18:01:10","modified_gmt":"2026-09-22T18:01:10","slug":"i-131-the-competition-authority-between-regulation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.mafr.fr\/en\/jorc\/jorc-review\/jorc-review-archives\/i-131-the-competition-authority-between-regulation\/","title":{"rendered":"I-1.31: The Competition Authority between \u201cregulation\u201d and competition policiy"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Two and a half years after having been established by the LME<a href='#_ftn1' name=\"_ftnref1\" title=\"\">[1]<\/a>, the French Competition Authority has uncontestably acquired its \u201cplace in the sun\u201d amongst the competition authorities of other countries, as demonstrated by multiple indicators. Its (excellent) global ranking amongst competition authorities performed by Global Competition Review is the best illustration<a href='#_ftn2' name=\"_ftnref2\" title=\"\">[2]<\/a> of this observation. But, we could also cite its international aura as demonstrated by the many invitations its President, Mr. Bruno Lasserre, has received to speak at the most prestigious international conferences, its leadership role in the European Competition Network and the International Competition Network<a href='#_ftn3' name=\"_ftnref3\" title=\"\">[3]<\/a>, or the headlines economic and financial publications have devoted to this Authority\u2019s decisions. <br \/><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The establishment of such an important \u201cauthority\u201d with so many powers justifies that practitioners momentarily forget the \u201cheat of the action\u201d to think about its role in France\u2019s legal and institutional system, in terms of its goals and whether it has the appropriate means in order to fulfill its goals.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The subject that will be discussed\u2014or even more modestly, will be initiated in this paper\u2014bears upon two points:<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">even though recent legal semantics cause hesitation on whether or not to classify the Competition Authority amongst the \u201cregulators\u201d, practice forces us to admit that it is a regulator;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">if the Competition Authority is a \u201cregulator\u201d, what is its place in relation to other institutions that make rules and also have a role in setting competition policy?<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h1 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">I.Even though this affirmation is not perfectly orthodox, the Competition Authority is indeed a \u201cregulator\u201d. <\/span><\/h1>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">1.According to proper legal orthodoxy, the Competition Authority was not designed to be a \u201cregulator\u201d. <\/span><\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">In order to determine whether or not an authority is a \u201cregulator\u201d, a practitioner must consult the many books and articles that have been written on the rise of \u201cregulation\u201d since the end of the 1970s. Without going so far back in time as to cite the \u201cfathers\u201d of regulation<a href='#_ftn4' name=\"_ftnref4\" title=\"\">[4]<\/a>, it is possible to consult Marie-Anne Frison-Roche\u2019s seminal article, which established the existence of a new branch of law, \u201cregulatory law\u201d <a href='#_ftn5' name=\"_ftnref5\" title=\"\">[5]<\/a>. Using this article, we can schematically identify the following characteristics of regulation:<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">a)It can be defined by its subject material (or the area to which it is applied, \u201c<em>ratione materiae<\/em>\u201d): regulation is applied to sectors of the economy that are not open or insufficiently open to competition, and\/or which are subject to a compromise between free-market competition and other principles of socio-economic organization (public service obligations, plurality of the media, respect of prudential rules, security, etc.)<\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">This approach has been confirmed both by the OECD<a href='#_ftn6' name=\"_ftnref6\" title=\"\">[6]<\/a> and by the International Competition Network<a href='#_ftn7' name=\"_ftnref7\" title=\"\">[7]<\/a>. The list of relevant sectors ceaselessly grows longer: in the beginning, the energy, telecommunications, transportation, and financial industries were targeted, but today, this list also includes healthcare and foodstuffs<a href='#_ftn8' name=\"_ftnref8\" title=\"\">[8]<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">A preliminary opposition of principle thus appears between competition law and regulation, as defined above: the common law of \u201ccompetition\u201d applies to all unregulated goods and services, and is not intended to construct and maintain competitive equilibrium within an industry, but rather to punish artificial hindrances to the \u201cnatural\u201d process of competition (cartels, abuse of dominance). In this sense, there are only sector-specific regulators, and the Competition Authority is not a regulator. <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">b)But, regulation can also be defined using its original methodology: it establishes an organizational and punitive relationship intended to achieve an efficient equilibrium between relevant operators, the requirements of openness to competition, and the other constraints placed on the industry. In this sense, \u201cthe end justifies regulation\u2019s means\u201d: the regulating authority must have all necessary powers (rule making, investigation, sanction) allowing it to act both <em>ex ante<\/em>, but also <em>ex post<\/em>, if needed.<\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Here once again, a competition authority is different from a sector-specific regulator because its essential role is not to act ex ante, but rather, ex post, thereby enforcing compliance with a preexisting rule rather than seeking effective action on the ground<a href='#_ftn9' name=\"_ftnref9\" title=\"\">[9]<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">c)Finally, regulation can be defined using the existence of specific institutions outside the State\u2019s traditional apparatus\u2014they are neither part of the civil service, nor are they tribunals: in France, they are described as belonging to the category of \u201cindependent administrative authorities\u201d<a href='#_ftn10' name=\"_ftnref10\" title=\"\">[10]<\/a>. <\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Anne Perrot<a href='#_ftn11' name=\"_ftnref11\" title=\"\">[11]<\/a> pointed out in 2002 that sector-specific regulators were significantly different from competition authorities, both in their approach\u2014\u2018technical\u2019 for the former, \u2018generalist\u2019 for the latter\u2014and in their composition (sector-specific regulators are mostly composed of experts), their method of intervention (sector-specific regulators intervene continuously, whereas competition authorities intervene on an ad hoc basis), and their procedures (the rules concerning due process and the separation of internal functions is less strict for sector-specific regulators). <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">2.But, this perspective does not allow us to distinguish the Competition Authority from a regulator in 2011. <\/span><\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">This is clearly the result of this institution\u2019s evolution, which has been confirmed by practitioners\u2019 perception of it. <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Let us compare the Competition Authority\u2019s recent evolution with the foregoing criteria that define \u201cregulators\u201d:<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">a)<u>From an institutional point of view, the Competition Authority clearly falls within the category of \u201cregulators\u201d. <\/u><\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Regulators\u2019 principal institutional specificity is that they are not part of the State\u2019s traditional apparatus. This is a quality absolutely shared by the Competition Authority. We can also observe that the rules relating to the composition, operations, and procedures of these authorities are becoming more similar, or even harmonized.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">We will simply cite the similarity in composition of France\u2019s most recent regulators (AMF, ACP, ARAF)<a href='#_ftn12' name=\"_ftnref12\" title=\"\">[12]<\/a>. Concerning operational and procedural rules, the principles defined by the Council of State and the Court of Cassation apply equally to all independent administrative authorities, so long as they have disciplinary powers, even though there can be some nuances in their implementation<a href='#_ftn13' name=\"_ftnref13\" title=\"\">[13]<\/a>. The broad alignment of the procedural rules applicable to sector-specific regulators and the Competition Authority is significant.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">b)<u>From a methodological point of view, the Competition Authority has acquired most of the attributes of sector-specific regulators that it did not initially possess <\/u><\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Although the two principal differences between these two authorities reside in whether they intervene ex post or ex ante, and in their possibility to make rules as a result, these differences have significantly decreased because of the Competition Authority\u2019s development of five types of instruments:<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><u>Negotiating commitments that affect an industry\u2019s competitive structure: <\/u><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">As a reminder, the competition commitments were introduced in France by executive order n\u00b02004-1873 on November 4, 2004,<a href='#_ftn14' name=\"_ftnref14\" title=\"\">[14]<\/a> and allow companies that agree to modify their behavior or activity on markets to avoid punishment. This represents the apparition of a \u201cnegotiated\u201d form of law in anticompetitive practices whose \u201c<em>interventionist aspect\u2026must not be dissimulated.\u201d<\/em><a href='#_ftn15' name=\"_ftnref15\" title=\"\">[15]<\/a>. The Competition Authority (and its predecessor, the <em>Conseil de la concurrence<\/em>) have gone farther and farther in this interventionism. A simple example: in 2006 the Council \u201cregulated\u201d online sales of products distributed within a selective distribution network\u2014watches, jewelry, hi-fi equipment, and cosmetics, successively<a href='#_ftn16' name=\"_ftnref16\" title=\"\">[16]<\/a>. \u201c<em>Many commentators regretted that the Council used a negotiation procedure to regulate an entire industry and make decisions on complex, and essential, questions on the relatively new subject of online distribution<\/em>.\u201d<a href='#_ftn17' name=\"_ftnref17\" title=\"\">[17]<\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The Council\u2014and now the Authority\u2014both act more as regulators than as classic competition authorities, because, without having to demonstrate the harm done to competition, they set the rules and enforce them using commitments.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The French system of <u>settlement<\/u> (<em>non-contestation des griefs<\/em>), was created by the <em>Loi portant nouvelles r\u00e9gulations \u00e9conomiques<\/em> (NRE) in 2001<a href='#_ftn18' name=\"_ftnref18\" title=\"\">[18]<\/a>, also allows companies to make commitments and leads to the same observation: the Council, and then the Authority, both regulate the market. In the \u201clinens\u201d and \u201ccables\u201d decisions<a href='#_ftn19' name=\"_ftnref19\" title=\"\">[19]<\/a>, the Council pointed out that in order to justify a reduction in the fine, the commitments proposed <em>\u201cmust be capable of substantially and verifiably ameliorating competition on the markets affected by these practices<\/em>.\u201d More precisely, in the \u201clinens\u201d decision, beyond the commitments made concerning procurement and tender bids that were designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior, the Council organized a whistleblowing procedure within the relevant companies.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The transfer of decision-making power <u>in merger review cases<\/u> from the Minister of the Economy to the Competition Authority was also performed by the <em>Loi de modernisation de l\u2019\u00e9conomie <\/em>(LME)<a href='#_ftn20' name=\"_ftnref20\" title=\"\">[20]<\/a>, and gave the Authority a broad range of ex ante regulatory activities. Of course, other competition authorities around the world have the same power, but this is a \u201cregulatory\u201d type power. We will also add that the multiplication of behavioral commitments within merger authorizations reinforces this regulatory aspect.<a href='#_ftn21' name=\"_ftnref21\" title=\"\">[21]<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">We must not omit the fact that the LME also granted the Competition Authority with a potentially very important regulatory power that results from its <u>possibility of self-referral in order to emit an opinion<\/u> \u201c<em>on any question concerning competition.\u201d <\/em>Commentators were not mistaken when they identified \u201cthe attribution of an economic regulatory function to the Competition Authority.\u201d<a href='#_ftn22' name=\"_ftnref22\" title=\"\">[22]<\/a> The Competition Authority itself stated this in its June 24, 2009 opinion (09-A-21) on fuel markets in French overseas territories: \u201c<em>The Authority has proposed reinforcing ex ante regulation in order to better supervise monopolies and ultimately guarantee the provision of fuel at the lowest price.\u201d<\/em> <a href='#_ftn23' name=\"_ftnref23\" title=\"\">[23]<\/a> The opinions recently published by the Competition Authority concerning the structural framework of supermarket distribution in France, and on online gambling<a href='#_ftn24' name=\"_ftnref24\" title=\"\">[24]<\/a>, include a series of recommendations to the Government, which become almost mandatory because they were published, and which incite it to adopt the necessary reforms. The relevant distributors also must follow these recommendations, because they risk prosecution if they do not comply. <a href='#_ftn25' name=\"_ftnref25\" title=\"\">[25]<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Similarly, let us not forget that <u>the Competition Authority has recently taken initiatives to create its own soft law<\/u>, beyond its statutory powers. Until very recently, the \u201cthematic studies\u201d contained in the Authority\u2019s annual reports could only very indirectly be interpreted in this fashion. But today, the Competition Authority directly publishes \u201cprocedural communiqu\u00e9s\u201d or even \u201cguidelines\u201d that very clearly play the same role as the erstwhile ministerial circulars that used to explain how to implement new laws and rules. The guidelines relative to merger reviews adopted in 2009 are an example, because they directly took the place of those issued by the <em>Direction g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la concurrence, de la consommation, et de la r\u00e9pression des fraudes <\/em>(DGCCRF)<a href='#_ftn26' name=\"_ftnref26\" title=\"\">[26]<\/a>. The Authority\u2019s \u201cprocedural communiqu\u00e9\u201d (the qualifier \u2018procedural\u2019 seems to have been forgotten, and now the Authority simply calls it the \u201ccommuniqu\u00e9\u201d) relative to the method of determining fines and defining the Competition Authority\u2019s disciplinary policy<a href='#_ftn27' name=\"_ftnref27\" title=\"\">[27]<\/a>, mimics the European Commission, which clearly has the normative power that the French authority does not officially have.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">c)Lastly, <u>it is no longer possible to characterize a \u201cregulator\u201d simply by its \u201csector-specificity\u201d in order to claim the Competition Authority is not one of them<\/u> <\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">First of all, because the generalist nature of the Competition Authority has not stopped it from being <u>just as technically competent as sector-specific regulators in regulated industries<\/u>, both in the traditional industries like telecommunications, and in newer ones. The dialogue was very strong between the French telecommunications regulators (the ARCEP \u2013 formerly the ART) and the French Competition Authority (as well as its predecessor the <em>Conseil de la concurrence<\/em>), and proved the regulatory audacity of the latter, in order to support the specialized regulator or to act in parallel to it (such as the measures imposed by the <em>Conseil de la concurrence <\/em>concerning broadband Internet access, and those recently recommended by the Authority<a href='#_ftn28' name=\"_ftnref28\" title=\"\">[28]<\/a>).<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">But, this \u201cexpert\u201d intervention on behalf of the Competition Authority has been particularly remarkable as of late in new industries, whether sector-regulated or not: not only concerning online gambling or the structure of supermarket distribution as already mentioned (<em>cf. supra <\/em>I-2-b), but also as concerns the role of train stations in intermodal transportation, or the market for digital books<a href='#_ftn29' name=\"_ftnref29\" title=\"\">[29]<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Also, more generally, there is no need to attribute sector-specific expertise to the Competition Authority because <u>there truly exists \u201chorizontal regulation\u201d where competition is concerned.<\/u> The Competition Authority is simply a horizontal regulator.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The Authority explicitly admits this reality: Mr. Lasserre himself said as early in 2001 \u201c<em>I am lucky enough to be a member of the <\/em>Conseil de la concurrence<em>, and therefore to be able to think about what horizontal regulation of competition means<\/em>\u201d <a href='#_ftn30' name=\"_ftnref30\" title=\"\">[30]<\/a>. Now that he has become the President of the Competition Authority, he has recently once again shown us his role as a regulator<a href='#_ftn31' name=\"_ftnref31\" title=\"\">[31]<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Let us be understood: the Competition Authority cannot simply style itself a regulator or develop this role by itself, using jurisprudence. Rather, doctrine has very generally admitted this reality beginning in the early 2000s<a href='#_ftn32' name=\"_ftnref32\" title=\"\">[32]<\/a>, and especially recently a number of articles have systematically referred to \u201ccompetition regulation\u201d or \u201ccompetition-based regulation\u201d to describe the Competition Authority\u2019s mission<a href='#_ftn33' name=\"_ftnref33\" title=\"\">[33]<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Even <u>from a conceptual point of view<\/u>, <u>we believe that the differences currently have more to do with nuance than with an actual difference<\/u>. Today, there exist many shared characteristics between a \u201cgeneralist\u201d regulator and a \u201csector-specific\u201d regulator, in France and abroad. Competition authorities share the specificity of being entities separate from the traditional branches of government and civil service. Furthermore, the distinction in terms of <em>ex ante<\/em>, as opposed to <em>ex post, <\/em>intervention is no longer certain since competition authorities generally perform merger reviews, which is an <em>ex ante<\/em> activity, and anyway in France, this distinction has progressively grown weaker with the multiplication of alternative forms of action, such as sanctions, self-referral, and \u201cguidelines\u201d. It is no longer possible to say that the <em>\u201cCompetition Authority does not oversee the markets as such<\/em>,\u201d<a href='#_ftn34' name=\"_ftnref34\" title=\"\">[34]<\/a> because the LME explicitly stated that the Competition Authority\u2019s mission is to \u201c<em>ensure free competition<\/em>\u201d <a href='#_ftn35' name=\"_ftnref35\" title=\"\">[35]<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Recognizing that there is a \u201cregulator\u201d of competition does not stop us from being able to distinguish competition law from regulatory law\u2014today, these are simply secant ensembles. The main problem does not seem to be semantic in nature, but rather resides in the way the competition regulator positions itself in relation to the other institutions also in charge of competition policy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 108pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h1 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">II.The Competition Authority\u2019s role and legitimacy in setting competition policy have increased, but there remain serious ambiguities that must be cleared up<\/span><\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The debate over whether or not the Competition Authority is a regulator must lead us to address the fundamental question from which this debate stems: are the important missions and powers invested in the Authority appropriately justified and supervised in accordance with a democratic institutional framework? In France, this debate has involved all independent administrative authorities, and excellent reports have been produced by the Council of State<a href='#_ftn36' name=\"_ftnref36\" title=\"\">[36]<\/a> and the Parliament<a href='#_ftn37' name=\"_ftnref37\" title=\"\">[37]<\/a>. However, both of these institutions\u2019 reports remain very broad and only contain a few lines about the Competition Authority. Doctrine has also addressed this question, more specifically when the LME was implemented<a href='#_ftn38' name=\"_ftnref38\" title=\"\">[38]<\/a>\u2014 a discussion that I would like to expound upon.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">1.Parliament has legitimated the Authority as a major actor in defining competition policy<\/span><\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Let us state that by \u201ccompetition policy,\u201d we mean the policy implemented by public powers using powerful means to enforce competition rules in order to promote free competition in the economy\u2014which goes beyond the simple definition of competition law and implies \u201cpolitical\u201d choices. This regulation has \u201cmajor political implications.\u201d<a href='#_ftn39' name=\"_ftnref39\" title=\"\">[39]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">a)The LME, along with the executive order of November 30, 2008, and a number of implementation decrees<a href='#_ftn40' name=\"_ftnref40\" title=\"\">[40]<\/a>, established the bases of the essential role the Competition Authority can play in competition policy.<\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">This role was intentionally devolved to the Authority, and the Senate was particularly interested in the reform and had decided to transpose into statute most of the new decisions regarding the missions and organization of the Competition Authority that the Government had initially planned to include in an executive order<a href='#_ftn41' name=\"_ftnref41\" title=\"\">[41]<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">As pointed out by many commentators, this important reform caused France to go from a \u201cbicephalous\u201d regime\u2014with a \u201cpolitical\u201d entity represented by the Minister of the Economy, with his \u201cstrong-arm,\u201d the DCGGRF, and a more \u201cexpert\u201d body, the <em>Conseil de la concurrence<\/em>\u2014to a single authority (or almost); \u201c<em>the Minister is no longer a competition authority<\/em>\u201d<a href='#_ftn42' name=\"_ftnref42\" title=\"\">[42]<\/a>. The approach adopted here led us to end the debate on \u201cmonism\u201d or \u201cdualism\u201d of competition authorities, because in France, like everywhere else, the Government continues to set competition policy, too, in a more or less conscientious and intense way. <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">In any case, the three types of powers regarding competition policy transferred to the Competition Authority or reinforced by the LME are: merger review, self-referral, and the transfer of full powers to perform competition investigations.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The transfer of the Minister\u2019s decision-making power to the Authority <u>regarding mergers<\/u> was the most visible aspect of the LME\u2019s reform of the institutional aspects of Competition Law in France. Of course, as the President of the Authority took care to point out, this transfer was part of a clear distribution of tasks: the Authority is supposed to make a decision using its technical expertise, based only upon competition law concerns; the Minister retains residual decision making power of a political sort, which can be used if there are issues of national interest at hand, other than competition law concerns<a href='#_ftn43' name=\"_ftnref43\" title=\"\">[43]<\/a>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">However, this pertinent observation does not cause another reality to disappear: reviewing mergers is a <em>ratione personae <\/em>decision, and so in the French legal order, should be made by the executive branch because it is an \u201cex ante\u201d intervention and could be an important decision for France\u2019s economic structures, which cannot be left to technical expertise alone. The vocabulary used does not change this profound reality (the test of \u201ceconomic efficiency\u201d that the Authority performs has replaced the \u201ceconomic appraisal\u201d that the Minister used to carry out).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">With the <u>new power of consultative self-referral<\/u>, Parliament has conferred power of intervention on the Authority, which is showing itself to be politically significant. Of course, as Mr. Lasserre stated, the Authority\u2019s opinions \u201c<em>are intended to provide a competition-based diagnostic and to encourage thought,<\/em>\u201d but they are also part of an ill-concealed strategy: \u201c<em>to allow the French Authority to <u>build a competition policy based on the areas most important to the economy<\/u><\/em>\u201d<a href='#_ftn44' name=\"_ftnref44\" title=\"\">[44]<\/a> (underlined by me).<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Even though it is less often remarked, <u>providing the Competition Authority with full investigatory powers<\/u> gives it the ability to create true \u201cinvestigatory powers\u201d: the investigations performed by the Authority are now used as one part of the ensemble of powers it has to \u201corient itself towards the initiatives that are thought to be strategic for the proper functioning of the economy (individual investigations, general market surveillance, studies, opinions, European activities)\u2026which are the fruit of a voluntary policy to define the priority and relative importance of various cases.\u201d<a href='#_ftn45' name=\"_ftnref45\" title=\"\">[45]<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Even though Parliament had devolved this power to the <em>Conseil de la concurrence <\/em>before the LME, the Authority uses its <u>commitment procedures<\/u> and <u>settlement procedures<\/u> in order to perform sector-specific regulation: <u>this is also part of competition policy<\/u> (<em>cf. supra<\/em> I-2-b)<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Finally, without hesitation, we can also include <u>disciplinary policy<\/u> in competition policy. The \u201cguidelines\u201d adopted by the Authority (even when they are called \u201ccommuniqu\u00e9s\u201d) is an explicit demonstration of this\u2014and proves true a simple remark made by the former Chief Justice of the Economic Regulation section of the Paris Appeals Court: the Authority \u201c<em>conducts the policy desired by Parliament, which is precisely composed of\u2026sanctions<\/em>\u201d<a href='#_ftn46' name=\"_ftnref46\" title=\"\">[46]<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">b)Parliament <u>intended to ensure the Authority\u2019s legitimacy using a number of safeguards<\/u><\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The principle that regulators should be independent from the executive branch is generally accepted today: for reasons of efficiency, this modern take on government intervention has become part of legal and political standards, especially where the economy is concerned.<a href='#_ftn47' name=\"_ftnref47\" title=\"\">[47]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">But, under the influence of evolving jurisprudence<a href='#_ftn48' name=\"_ftnref48\" title=\"\">[48]<\/a> and Parliamentary criticism<a href='#_ftn49' name=\"_ftnref49\" title=\"\">[49]<\/a>, lawmakers have conditioned the \u201ccompetition regulator\u2019s\u201d increased powers with a certain number of safeguards, which must be described, albeit briefly: <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><u>The separation between investigation and disciplinary powers has been <\/u>reinforced within the Competition Authority by the creation of two distinct hierarchies: the <em>Rapporteur G\u00e9n\u00e9ral<\/em> is in charge of investigations, and the <em>\u201cColl\u00e8ge\u201d<\/em> (members of the Authority) is in charge of disciplinary sanctions. This has caused a change in the distribution of tasks as compared to the way the <em>Conseil de la concurrence <\/em>used to function.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><u>Due process has been improved<\/u> in litigation before the Competition Authority, with the explicit provision that lawyers are allowed to be present during investigations involving searches, the creation of a \u201chearing officer,\u201d and increased protection of business secrets, etc. <\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><u>Judicial review has been increased<\/u> in companies\u2019 favor, in order to ensure the double degree of jurisdiction demanded by the ECHR<a href='#_ftn50' name=\"_ftnref50\" title=\"\">[50]<\/a> for appeals against warrants authorizing searches and seizure.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><u>Creation of a parliamentary review<\/u> with Parliament being consulted as to the appointment of the Authority\u2019s President, the obligation for the Authority to perform an annual accountability report to the Parliament, and the possibility of Parliament to hear the Authority\u2019s President<a href='#_ftn51' name=\"_ftnref51\" title=\"\">[51]<\/a>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">2.There remain significant ambiguities that must be cleared up<\/span><\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The foregoing observations are similar to those of a number of commentators in that they point out a certain number of unresolved problems in the Competition Authority\u2019s place in the larger institutional picture.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Of course, the general and inevitable problem\u2014or even oxymoron<a href='#_ftn52' name=\"_ftnref52\" title=\"\">[52]<\/a>\u2014that the Authority shares with other independent administrative authorities because of its hybrid character results from the major contradiction between its \u201cadministrative\u201d character (it is neither private, nor judiciary\u2026but a \u201cpublic power\u201d that is part of the State) and its independence (which prevents it from being subordinate to the State). Nonetheless, a democratic regime obliges all regulators to \u201c<em>remain liable for the use they make of their powers,<\/em>\u201d <a href='#_ftn53' name=\"_ftnref53\" title=\"\">[53]<\/a> and to try and maintain coherency between the use each one makes of its powers, and the use the other public powers in charge of competition policy make of theirs. <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The main questions raised regarding these objectives are: the distribution of tasks between the Competition Authority and the Government, and judicial and parliamentary review of the Authority, which should both be improved. <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">a)<u>The distribution of tasks between the Authority and the Government<\/u><\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Four points concerning the distribution of tasks currently seem essential: rulemaking, the setting of strategic priorities, coordination between the Authority and the civil service, and international representation. <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The <u>devolution of rulemaking power<\/u>, which has become current practice for \u201cregulators,\u201d is still seen as a \u201cdismembering of the State\u201d in the French tradition, and concerns the executive branch more than the legislative, because the power involves \u201crules\u201d rather than \u201claws\u201d<a href='#_ftn54' name=\"_ftnref54\" title=\"\">[54]<\/a>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The Competition Authority thereby creates its \u201csoft law,\u201d principally made up of its \u201cguidelines\u201d or \u201cprocedural <em>communiqu\u00e9s<\/em>.\u201d Since no jurisprudence has been issued on this kind of documents, except on the European level<a href='#_ftn55' name=\"_ftnref55\" title=\"\">[55]<\/a>, what value should they be accorded in order to ensure them legal security and a place in the French legal arsenal, while making sure that they retain the requisite flexibility? There is no easy answer, but a possible solution would be to turn towards the ratification procedure created for certain rules created by regulators<a href='#_ftn56' name=\"_ftnref56\" title=\"\">[56]<\/a>, or perhaps to look at the Council of State\u2019s jurisprudence according broad protection to ministerial circulars<a href='#_ftn57' name=\"_ftnref57\" title=\"\">[57]<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><u>\u201c<em>Defining thoughtful strategic priorities<\/em>\u201d<\/u><a href='#_ftn58' name=\"_ftnref58\" title=\"\">[58]<\/a> is something that all practitioners urgently wish for when faced with the eternal fluctuation of competition\u2019s place in government policy, and the manifest divergence between the Government and the Authority on questions such as disciplinary policy against anticompetitive practices, for example in the steel-trading case<a href='#_ftn59' name=\"_ftnref59\" title=\"\">[59]<\/a>: this case successively involved a government initiative, the creation of an <em>ad hoc <\/em>commission<a href='#_ftn60' name=\"_ftnref60\" title=\"\">[60]<\/a>, and then the elaboration of a \u201c<em>communiqu\u00e9<\/em>\u201d by the Authority, whose president was forced to explain that this was not a conflict over \u201c<em>who was in control<\/em>\u201d <a href='#_ftn61' name=\"_ftnref61\" title=\"\">[61]<\/a>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The fundamental question of \u201cwho does what\u201d in terms of strategy is not easy to answer here. Let us take three concrete examples before broadening the debate.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Concerning <u>merger reviews<\/u>, there has not been an obvious problem up to now because there have been no \u201csensitive\u201d mergers since the reform. But, there is great uncertainty as to the role of the \u201cgovernment\u2019s commissioner,\u201d as to how the Minister will be able to justify going into \u201cphase 2\u201d and how the Authority will react. How will the Minister justify making a decision contrary to the Authority\u2019s at the end of phase 2 without disobeying European law? We expect to see guidelines published by the Minister of the Economy concerning such cases.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Concerning <u>self-referral<\/u>, perhaps we should reduce the Authority\u2019s powers, because otherwise they might go directly against the Government\u2019s priorities. The solution might be to adopt the \u201cAttali Commission\u2019s\u201d proposition<a href='#_ftn62' name=\"_ftnref62\" title=\"\">[62]<\/a>, which limited self-referral to draft rules and legislation. If it is not desired to publicly reduce the Authority\u2019s powers, it is at least necessary to instate an \u201cinstitutional dialogue\u201d between the Authority and the Government on the opportunity of performing such and such self-referral, and that the Government retain the power to decide whether or not to act on the Authority\u2019s opinions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Concerning <u>disciplinary policy<\/u>, the contestation of the policies adopted lately by the French Authority (and moreover the European one) <a href='#_ftn63' name=\"_ftnref63\" title=\"\">[63]<\/a> should lead us to think about the best possible approach. The finalization of the \u201cguidelines\u201d on fines in the form of a communiqu\u00e9 is the right occasion to ask ourselves two questions: if the Government agrees, does it have to \u201cratify\u201d this document? And if it does not agree, what will it do, since it cannot even ask the Authority to reconsider its decision? It is rather amusing to note that the Paris Court of Appeals will be in charge of applying administrative case law concerning this statute\u2019s legal value.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><u>More importantly, there are a certain number of purely \u201cpolitical\u201d choices that must be made:<\/u> what degree of competition is desired in each industry (this especially concerns industries without a specific regulator: taxis, self-employed professionals, supermarkets, etc.)? What is the place of public service (unregulated transportation, health, etc.)? What are the local or social interests that must be taken into consideration? Which investments should be made first? <a href='#_ftn64' name=\"_ftnref64\" title=\"\">[64]<\/a> This leads us back to wondering whether the Government or the \u201ccompetition regulator\u201d is best equipped to make the most appropriate long-term social choices (at least in industries where there is no specific regulator, and sometimes even in industries where there are, such as energy, for example).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">At this point, we can make two \u201creasonable\u201d recommendations: an annual, explicit determination by the Government of its priorities in competition policy, alongside the Authority\u2019s (which have already been published), and a constructive and institutionalized dialogue on this subject between the two institutions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><u>Practical coordination between the Authority and the DGCCRF<\/u> has happily never ended, but there have been visible tensions and misunderstandings between the two since the LME has come into effect. This does not mean that the Authority\u2019s preeminent role, as desired by Parliament, should be reconsidered, but rather that the coordination between the two bodies should be made more harmonious and therefore more efficient in areas where the DGCCRF still has jurisdiction. Let us take two practical areas of application as an example:<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The first concerns the <u>DGCCRF\u2019s residual role in competition investigations.<\/u> This role cannot be ignored, since the most recent legal texts regarding its organization gives it, including at the local level, the task of \u201c<em>controlling the functioning of competition<\/em>\u201d<a href='#_ftn65' name=\"_ftnref65\" title=\"\">[65]<\/a> Because the national investigation squad was transferred to the Authority, there is a risk that less attention will be given to the \u201cclues\u201d of anticompetitive practices picked up on by the DGCCRF\u2019s local investigators<a href='#_ftn66' name=\"_ftnref66\" title=\"\">[66]<\/a>. Of course, some of these clues can be used to deal with \u201clocal\u201d anticompetitive practices, which are still part of the DGCCRF\u2019s responsibility<a href='#_ftn67' name=\"_ftnref67\" title=\"\">[67]<\/a>. But, as for the rest, only permanent coordination between the two bodies\u2019 investigation capacities will allow the DGCCRF\u2019s local teams to remain involved in this area.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The second area has to do with the DGCCRF\u2019s central administration: <u>the role of the \u201cgovernment\u2019s commissioner\u201d must be optimized<\/u>. This person could be the best means for coordination between the two bodies. The presence of a government commissioner within all independent administrative authorities was recommended by Parliament<a href='#_ftn68' name=\"_ftnref68\" title=\"\">[68]<\/a>, and such a post has existed within the French competition authority since its inception. Optimizing this post means that it must be placed high up in the hierarchy in order to effectively and regularly convey the Government\u2019s strategic point of view in important cases. We note that the current president of the Authority himself expressed the wish that the \u201c<em>government ensure that it frankly notify him of its objectives<\/em>\u201d <a href='#_ftn69' name=\"_ftnref69\" title=\"\">[69]<\/a>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">As concerns <u>international representation<\/u>, we understand the simple solution introduced by the LME, which consists in leaving France\u2019s seat in European and international competition bodies to the \u201csingle\u201d Competition Authority, but we should remember that in 2001 the Council of State recommended that \u201c<em>if it involves a meeting where decisions are to be made, only authorities that are responsible to the Government should speak.\u201d<\/em> <a href='#_ftn70' name=\"_ftnref70\" title=\"\">[70]<\/a> This principle should be followed and as long as the Minister has jurisdiction over the matter, he should continue to be represented at the Consultative Committee on Mergers in Brussels.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">b)<u>Judicial and Parliamentary review of the Authority<\/u><\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 54pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">The Authority\u2019s relationship with judges and the Parliament are currently the necessary checks-and-balances to counterbalance its independence from the Government. There remain, however, weak spots in the way these checks-and-balances are carried out, which are not necessarily what we think they are.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Judicial review is exercised over the Competition Authority by two different sorts of judges when its decisions are appealed\u2014the Paris Court of Appears for anticompetitive practices, and the Council of State for merger review. We do not agree with the Parliament that all appeals should be unified under a single judge<a href='#_ftn71' name=\"_ftnref71\" title=\"\">[71]<\/a>, since French culture tolerates this duality in many areas and the distinction between merger review and anticompetitive practices does not create significant procedural problems.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">Yet, we should be concerned with the difficulty resulting from the \u201cvertical\u201d way in which such appeals are organized, especially between the Competition Authority and the Paris Court of Appeals, which leads to difficult showdowns. We agree with the suggestions that have already been published to fix the imbalance between a Court ill-equipped to deal with such a dynamic and expert Authority, and which has led to many of the Parisian court\u2019s decisions being quashed by the Court of Cassation (\u201cthe disavowal of disavowals\u201d); it is necessary to increase the Chamber of Economic Regulation\u2019s means and expertise, especially by \u201c<em>hiring economic drafters and assistants.<\/em>\u201d <a href='#_ftn72' name=\"_ftnref72\" title=\"\">[72]<\/a> Even by doing so, we need not fear a \u201cgovernment of judges\u201d concerning competition law. We also suggest improved coordination between the counsel for the prosecution and the ministry\u2019s representative before the Appeals Court\u2014this would give more strength to those who defend the general interest, since the divergent positions revealed during the steel industry case, for example, were incomprehensible and harmful to the general interest.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><u>Parliamentary review<\/u> of the Competition Authority was introduced by the LME, but suffers from the same sorts of weaknesses as the Paris Court of Appeals: insufficient expertise. We have mentioned the \u201cdemocratic deficit\u201d involving oversight of the competition regulator<a href='#_ftn73' name=\"_ftnref73\" title=\"\">[73]<\/a>. Unless we implement political liability where the Authority is concerned, accountability and ex-post evaluation of its actions must be improved. The last parliamentary report on the subject<a href='#_ftn74' name=\"_ftnref74\" title=\"\">[74]<\/a> was severely criticized<a href='#_ftn75' name=\"_ftnref75\" title=\"\">[75]<\/a>, and its weaknesses seem to come from the absence of relevant expertise in both houses of Parliament, for even when such expertise exists, the members who possess it are often not available. We might hope that specialized parliamentary assistants might be hired, and especially that deputies and senators will pay more attention to the subject. Let us not forget that the parliamentary review will be improved if it increases it scope to encompass the repartition of competition policy and strategy between the Government and the Authority. It might even be possible to increase Parliamentary review of the Authority \u201cAmerican style\u201d if the Government abdicates too many of its powers in setting competition policy to an independent authority.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">*<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">*\u00a0*<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">In 2008, France made an important choice for society by adopting the LME and by creating an independent horizontal regulatory authority for the entire economy: the competition regulator. This type of \u201cregulation\u201d is a modern answer\u2014at the crossroads of law, economics, and politics\u2014to emphasizing the useful role of competition in a complex \u201csocial market economy.\u201d But, since the Competition Authority is a primary actor in competition policy, it must become a harmonious and conscientious member of France\u2019s broader economic and social policy: this means that competition must be able to be \u201cregulated\u201d<a href='#_ftn76' name=\"_ftnref76\" title=\"\">[76]<\/a> either by explicitly supporting and prolonging the Authority\u2019s opinions, especially concerning structural reforms, as well as in ways that go against the Authority\u2019s wishes. It is primarily the Government\u2019s responsibility, and subsidiarity, Parliament\u2019s, to supervise the proper execution of these responsibilities. We would be pleased if the foregoing thoughts helped improve the framework for the coordination and trade-offs that are needed.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 72pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<div>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br clear=\"all\"><\/span><\/div>\n<\/p>\n<hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\">\n<div id=\"ftn1\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref1' name=\"_ftn1\" title=\"\">[1]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Loi de Modernisation de l\u2019Economie\u2013<\/em> <em>Journal Officiel de la R\u00e9publique Fran\u00e7aise<\/em> n\u00b0 181, 5 August 2008, p. 12471.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn2\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref2' name=\"_ftn2\" title=\"\">[2]<\/a>\u00a0\u201c<em>Rating enforcement 2010<\/em>\u201d &#8211; <em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.globalcompetitionreview.com\/\">www.globalcompetitionreview.com<\/a><\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn3\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref3' name=\"_ftn3\" title=\"\">[3]<\/a>\u00a0Mr. Bruno Lasserre was notably one of the two co-presidents of the International Competition Network\u2019s working group, <em>Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn4\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref4' name=\"_ftn4\" title=\"\">[4]<\/a>\u00a0Ronald Coase and Richard Posner in the United States, cf. proceedings of <em>La r\u00e9gulation en France<\/em>, a colloquium organized by <em>l\u2019Institut Fran\u00e7ais des Sciences Administratives<\/em> on 4-5 Nov. 1999, <em>Petites Affiches n\u00b0\u00a0223, 8 Nov. 2000<\/em>\u00a0; also Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, <em>L\u2019Etat, le march\u00e9 et les principes du droit interne et communautaire de la concurrence<\/em>, Petites Affiches, 17 May 1995, n\u00b0\u00a059, p. 4.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn5\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref5' name=\"_ftn5\" title=\"\">[5]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Le droit de la r\u00e9gulation, Dalloz 2001<\/em>, p. 610.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn6\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref6' name=\"_ftn6\" title=\"\">[6]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Relationship between Regulators and Competition Authorities &#8211; OCDE DAFFE\/CLP Report (99) 8<\/em>, 24 June 1999.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn7\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref7' name=\"_ftn7\" title=\"\">[7]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors Working Group &#8211; Subgroup: interrelations between antitrust and regulating authorities &#8211; Report to the third ICN Annual Conference, Seoul, April 2004.\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org\/\">www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org<\/a><\/em><em>.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn8\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref8' name=\"_ftn8\" title=\"\">[8]<\/a>\u00a0Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, <em>La r\u00e9gulation, objet d\u2019une branche du droit. <\/em>Petites Affiches n\u00b0 110, 3\u00a0June 2002.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn9\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref9' name=\"_ftn9\" title=\"\">[9]<\/a>\u00a0The differentiation between \u201cex-ante and ex-post intervention\u201d has been the subject of a number of academic articles.\u00a0See especially <em>Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Dialectique entre concurrence et r\u00e9gulation, Actualit\u00e9 du droit de la R\u00e9gulation, Revue Lamy Concurrence 2008<\/em>, and by the same author: <em>Ex-ante\/Ex-post, les 100 mots de la r\u00e9gulation, coll. \u201cQue sais-je?\u201d, 2011<\/em>; also, Anne Perrot, <em>les fronti\u00e8res entre r\u00e9gulation sectorielle et politique de la concurrence<\/em>, <em>Revue Fran\u00e7aise d\u2019Economie, vol.\u00a016 n\u00b0\u00a04-2002<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn10\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref10' name=\"_ftn10\" title=\"\">[10]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat, Rapport public 2001. Les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes; Assembl\u00e9e Nationale, Rapport d\u2019information du Comit\u00e9 d\u2019\u00e9valuation et du contr\u00f4le des politiques publiques <\/em>par Ren\u00e9 Dosi\u00e8re et Christian Vanneste,<em> 29 Oct. 2010<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn11\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref11' name=\"_ftn11\" title=\"\">[11]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Les fronti\u00e8res entre r\u00e9gulation sectorielle et politique de la concurrence,<\/em>\u00a0op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn12\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref12' name=\"_ftn12\" title=\"\">[12]<\/a>\u00a0AMF : Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers (French Financial Markets Authority), <em>loi n\u00b0\u00a02003-706 of 1 Aug. 2003<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">ACP\u00a0: Autorit\u00e9 du Contr\u00f4le Prudentiel (Prudential Supervisory Authority), <em>ordonnance of 21 Jan. 2010<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">ARAF\u00a0: Autorit\u00e9 de r\u00e9gulation des activit\u00e9s ferroviaires (French Railway Regulator), <em>loi n\u00b0\u00a02009-1503 of 8 Dec. 2009.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn13\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref13' name=\"_ftn13\" title=\"\">[13]<\/a>\u00a0Especially the jurisprudence concerning the separation between investigation and disciplinary powers, derived from the following decision: <em>Cass. Com. 5 Oct 1999 &#8211; Bull. Civ. 1999, IV. n\u00b0 159<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn14\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref14' name=\"_ftn14\" title=\"\">[14]<\/a>\u00a0Today <em>Code de commerce, Article <\/em>. L. 464-2 I.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn15\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref15' name=\"_ftn15\" title=\"\">[15]<\/a>\u00a0Patricia Kipriani,<em> Les engagements\u00a0: vers un droit \u00ab\u00a0n\u00e9goci\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb en mati\u00e8re de pratiques anticoncurrentielles &#8211; Contrat Concurrence Consommation n\u00b0 12-2010, \u00e9tude 13.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn16\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref16' name=\"_ftn16\" title=\"\">[16]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Cons. Conc., d\u00e9cision n\u00b0\u00a006-D-24, 4 juillet 2006, relative\u00a0\u00e0 la distribution des montres commercialis\u00e9es par Festina France\u00a0; d\u00e9cision n\u00b0\u00a006-D-28, 5 oct. 2006, relative \u00e0 des pratiques mises en \u0153uvre dans le secteur de la distribution collective de mat\u00e9riel Hi-Fi et Home Cinema\u00a0; d\u00e9cision n\u00b0\u00a007-D-07, 8 mars 2007, relative \u00e0 des pratiques mises en \u0153uvre dans le secteur de la distribution de produits cosm\u00e9tiques et d\u2019hygi\u00e8ne corporelle.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn17\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref17' name=\"_ftn17\" title=\"\">[17]<\/a>\u00a0J\u00e9r\u00f4me Philippe,<em> l\u2019av\u00e8nement des proc\u00e9dures de coop\u00e9ration devant le Conseil de la concurrence\u00a0: cl\u00e9mence, engagements, transaction, Contrats Concurrence Consommation n\u00b0\u00a012-2006,<\/em> 28.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn18\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref18' name=\"_ftn18\" title=\"\">[18]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Loi sur les nouvelles r\u00e9gulations \u00e9conomiques du 15 May 2001\u00a0; Commercial Cod, article L.464-2-III<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn19\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref19' name=\"_ftn19\" title=\"\">[19]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Cons. conc., d\u00e9cision n\u00b0\u00a007-D-21, 26 June 2007, relative \u00e0 des pratiques mises en \u0153uvre dans le secteur de la location &#8211; entretien de\u00a0linge ; d\u00e9cision n\u00b0\u00a007-D-26, 26 July 2007, relative \u00e0 des pratiques mises en \u0153uvre dans le cadre des march\u00e9s de fourniture de c\u00e2bles \u00e0 haute tension<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn20\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref20' name=\"_ftn20\" title=\"\">[20]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Loi de modernisation de l\u2019\u00e9conomie du 4 Aug. 2008<\/em>,\u00a0op. cit. <em>art. 86<\/em>\u00a0; for comments, see Stanislas Martin,<em> La LME transf\u00e8re le contr\u00f4le des concentrations \u00e0 une nouvelle autorit\u00e9 de la concurrence. Concurrences 4-2008, Chronique Concentrations, p. 99<\/em>\u00a0; Antoine Choffel and Emmanuel Reille,<em> l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 de la concurrence\u00a0: unifier pour mieux r\u00e9guler. <\/em><em>D\u00e9cideurs SFD n\u00b0\u00a097, Sept. 2008<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn21\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref21' name=\"_ftn21\" title=\"\">[21]<\/a>\u00a0Cf. the dozens of commitments taken by applicants to obtain authorizations; for example: decision of the Competition Authority<em> n\u00b0\u00a010-DCC-198 of 30\u00a0Dec. 2010<\/em> <em>relative \u00e0 la cr\u00e9ation d\u2019une entreprise commune par Veolia Environnement et la Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations<\/em>, which included a series of commitments, including the creation of a \u201ccompetition stimulus fund\u201d concerning urban transportation networks.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn22\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref22' name=\"_ftn22\" title=\"\">[22]<\/a>\u00a0Michel Bazex,<em> L\u2019attribution d\u2019une fonction de r\u00e9gulation \u00e9conomique \u00e0 l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 de la concurrence. Contrats Concurrence Consommation n\u00b0 3-2011, comm. 76.<\/em> One of the Authority\u2019s members, Patrick Spillaert, says the same thing when he evokes \u00ab\u00a0<em>construction normative originale\u00a0<\/em>\u00bb [original normative construction] in<em>: Les avis de l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 de la concurrence, Concurrences 3-2010<\/em>,<em> p. 58<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn23\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref23' name=\"_ftn23\" title=\"\">[23]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Communiqu\u00e9 de presse de l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 de la concurrence, 24 June 2009<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn24\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref24' name=\"_ftn24\" title=\"\">[24]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Avis n\u00b0 10-A-26 of 7 Dec. 2010 sur les contrats d\u2019affiliation des magasins ind\u00e9pendants et les modalit\u00e9s d\u2019acquisition de foncier commercial dans le secteur de la distribution alimentaire et n\u00b0 10-A-25 of 7 Dec. 2010 sur les contrats de \u00ab\u00a0management cat\u00e9goriel\u00a0\u00bb\u00a0; avis n\u00b0\u00a011-A-02 of 20 Jan 2011 relatif au secteur des jeux d\u2019argent et de hasard en ligne.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn25\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref25' name=\"_ftn25\" title=\"\">[25]<\/a>\u00a0Whence Leclerc\u2019s appeal before the Council of State against <em>avis n\u00b0\u00a010-A-26 of 7 Dec. 2010, relatif aux contrats d\u2019affiliation de magasins ind\u00e9pendants et les modalit\u00e9s d\u2019acquisition de foncier commercial dans le secteur de la distribution alimentaire<\/em>, cf. letter by Michel-Edouard Leclerc published by la Tribune on 15\u00a0Dec 2010.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn26\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref26' name=\"_ftn26\" title=\"\">[26]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Lignes directrices de l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 de la concurrence relatives au contr\u00f4le des concentrations<\/em>, adopted on 16 Dec 2009 and enforced from 12 Jan 2010 (Authority\u2019s website).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn27\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref27' name=\"_ftn27\" title=\"\">[27]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Communiqu\u00e9 of 16 May 2011 relatif \u00e0 la m\u00e9thode de d\u00e9termination des sanctions p\u00e9cuniaires<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn28\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref28' name=\"_ftn28\" title=\"\">[28]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Cons. Conc., avis n\u00b008-A-09, 5 Jun. 2008, relatif \u00e0 une demande d\u2019avis de l\u2019ARCEP dans le cadre de la proc\u00e9dure d\u2019analyse des march\u00e9s de gros du haut d\u00e9bit et du\u00a0tr\u00e8s haut d\u00e9bit<\/em>\u00a0; voir le commentaire de Michel Bazex, <em>les modalit\u00e9s du recours \u00e0 la r\u00e9gulation ex-ante (suite), Contrats Concurrence Consommation n\u00b07, July 2008, comm. 180\u00a0; avis n\u00b0 11-A-05 du 8 March 2011 relatif \u00e0 une demande d\u2019avis de l\u2019ARCEP portant sur le 3\u00e8me cycle d\u2019analyse des march\u00e9s de gros du haut d\u00e9bit et tr\u00e8s haut d\u00e9bit<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn29\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref29' name=\"_ftn29\" title=\"\">[29]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Avis n\u00b0 09-S0A-01, 18 May 2009, relatif \u00e0 une saisine d\u2019office pour avis dans le secteur du transport public terrestre de voyageurs\u00a0; avis n\u00b0 09-A-56, 18 Dec 2009, relatif \u00e0 une demande d\u2019avis du minist\u00e8re de la culture et de la communication portant sur le livre num\u00e9rique<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn30\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref30' name=\"_ftn30\" title=\"\">[30]<\/a>\u00a0Bruno Lasserre<em>, Qu\u2019est-ce qu\u2019un r\u00e9gulateur\u00a0? Avis du colloque international de l\u2019Universit\u00e9 Paris-Dauphine des 17-18 May 2001 sur les strat\u00e9gies d\u2019entreprise dans les nouvelles r\u00e9gulations \u2013 <u>campus.media9.dauphine.fr\/virtuel\/video\/conferences\/regulations.htm<\/u><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn31\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref31' name=\"_ftn31\" title=\"\">[31]<\/a>\u00a0Bruno Lasserre<em>, La r\u00e9gulation concurrentielle, un an apr\u00e8s sa r\u00e9forme\u00a0: un point de vue d\u2019autorit\u00e9 (I), Concurrences n\u00b0 3-2010, et (II), Concurrences n\u00b0 4-2010.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn32\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref32' name=\"_ftn32\" title=\"\">[32]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat, Les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes, op.cit. (voir notamment p. 346)\u00a0; <\/em>J. de Guillenchmidt,<em> le sectoriel et le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral dans le droit de la r\u00e9gulation, Petites Affiches n\u00b0 110, 3 Jun 2002<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn33\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref33' name=\"_ftn33\" title=\"\">[33]<\/a>\u00a0Inter alia: Laurence Idot et Christophe Lemaire, <em>Le nouveau visage de la r\u00e9gulation de la concurrence, S.J. Ed. G\u00e9n\u00e9rale<\/em> n\u00b012, Mar 2009, <em>I 125<\/em>\u00a0; Thierry Dahan et Christophe Lemaire, <em>Portrait de l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 en jeune fille\u00a0: l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 de la concurrence issue de la LME<\/em>, <em>Revue Juridique de l\u2019Economie Publique n\u00b0 683, Feb 2011<\/em>\u00a0; Denys de B\u00e9chillon et Thierry Tuot, <em>Autorit\u00e9s de r\u00e9gulation\u00a0: l\u2019\u00e2ge adulte, Les Echos, 10 Mar 2011<\/em>\u00a0; <em>DGCCRF, Actualit\u00e9s, Dossiers th\u00e9matiques, commentaires du rapport du groupe de travail de l\u2019ICN sur la r\u00e9partition des comp\u00e9tences entre autorit\u00e9s de concurrence et r\u00e9gulateurs sectoriels, 2004<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn34\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref34' name=\"_ftn34\" title=\"\">[34]<\/a>\u00a0Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, <em>Les 100 mots de la r\u00e9gulation<\/em>, op. cit. \u2013 <em>p. 26<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn35\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref35' name=\"_ftn35\" title=\"\">[35]<\/a>\u00a0<em>C. com. art. L.461-1-I<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn36\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref36' name=\"_ftn36\" title=\"\">[36]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat, rapport public 2001 sur les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes<\/em>, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn37\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref37' name=\"_ftn37\" title=\"\">[37]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Rapport sur les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes de l\u2019office parlementaire pour l\u2019\u00e9valuation de la l\u00e9gislation <\/em>by Patrice G\u00e9lard<em>, Les Rapports du S\u00e9nat, June 2006<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn38\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref38' name=\"_ftn38\" title=\"\">[38]<\/a>\u00a0Cf. articles cited in footnote 33.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn39\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref39' name=\"_ftn39\" title=\"\">[39]<\/a>\u00a0Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, <em>Les 100 mots de la r\u00e9gulation<\/em>, pr\u00e9c. p. 116.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn40\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref40' name=\"_ftn40\" title=\"\">[40]<\/a>\u00a0The <em>d\u00e9crets d\u2019application <\/em>concerning the Competition Authority are as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0<br \/><strong>&#8211;<\/strong> d\u00e9crets n\u00b0 2009-139 \u00e0 2009-142, 10 Feb 2009 <em>relatifs respectivement au toilettage de la partie r\u00e9glementaire du Code de commerce, au r\u00e9gime des pratiques anticoncurrentielles locales confi\u00e9 \u00e0 la DGCCRF, \u00e0 la repr\u00e9sentation de l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 par son pr\u00e9sident et au nouveau r\u00e9gime de protection des affaires\u00a0;<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0&#8211; d\u00e9crets n\u00b0 2009-185 et 2009-186, 17 Feb 2009<em> relatifs respectivement \u00e0 la publication des d\u00e9cisions de l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 en mati\u00e8re de pratiques anticoncurrentielles et au contr\u00f4le des concentrations\u00a0;<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0&#8211; d\u00e9cret n\u00b0 2009-322, 20 Mar 2009, <em>relatif \u00e0 la prise en charge des enqu\u00eates par le rapporteur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral\u00a0;<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0&#8211; d\u00e9cret n\u00b0 2009-735, 26 Mar 2009 <em>relatif au conseiller-auditeur<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn41\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref41' name=\"_ftn41\" title=\"\">[41]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Rapport de la Commission sp\u00e9ciale pr\u00e9sid\u00e9e par M. G\u00e9rard Larcher<\/em>, drawn up by Laurent B\u00e9teille, Elisabeth Lamure et Philippe Marini,<em> S\u00e9nat, session ordinaire de 2007-2008, n\u00b0 413<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn42\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref42' name=\"_ftn42\" title=\"\">[42]<\/a>\u00a0Thierry Dahan &#038; Christophe Lemaire,<em> Portrait de l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 en jeune fille\u2026<\/em> op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn43\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref43' name=\"_ftn43\" title=\"\">[43]<\/a>\u00a0Bruno Lasserre, <em>La r\u00e9gulation concurrentielle un an apr\u00e8s sa r\u00e9forme\u00a0: un point de vue d\u2019autorit\u00e9 (I),<\/em> op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn44\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref44' name=\"_ftn44\" title=\"\">[44]<\/a>\u00a0Bruno Lasserre, <em>\u00a0La r\u00e9gulation concurrentielle un an apr\u00e8s sa r\u00e9forme\u00a0: un point de vue d\u2019autorit\u00e9 (II)<\/em>, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn45\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref45' name=\"_ftn45\" title=\"\">[45]<\/a>\u00a0Ibid.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn46\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref46' name=\"_ftn46\" title=\"\">[46]<\/a>\u00a0Thierry Fossier, Le <em>\u00ab\u00a0sentencing\u00a0\u00bb en droit de la concurrence, Revue Lamy Droit des Affaires\u00a0n\u00b050, juin 2010<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn47\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref47' name=\"_ftn47\" title=\"\">[47]<\/a>\u00a0Notamment depuis le rapport 2001 du Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat sur les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes, pr\u00e9c.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn48\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref48' name=\"_ftn48\" title=\"\">[48]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Arr\u00eat Cass. Com. 5 octobre 1999<\/em>\u00a0: <em>Bull. civ. 1999, IV, n\u00b0159<\/em>, transposant la jurisprudence de la Cour Europ\u00e9enne des Droits de l\u2019Homme \u2013 cf. Laurence Idot et Christophe Lemaire, <em>Le nouveau visage de la r\u00e9gulation de la concurrence en France \u2013 l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 de la concurrence entre deux Europe, pr\u00e9c.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn49\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref49' name=\"_ftn49\" title=\"\">[49]<\/a>\u00a0Patrice G\u00e9lard, <em>Rapport sur les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes, Office Parlementaire pour l\u2019\u00e9valuation de la l\u00e9gislation, les rapports du S\u00e9nat 2006, n\u00b02166-404<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn50\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref50' name=\"_ftn50\" title=\"\">[50]<\/a>\u00a0Ravon <em>et al. v. France, ECJ case n\u00b0 18497\/03, 21 Feb 2008.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn51\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref51' name=\"_ftn51\" title=\"\">[51]<\/a>\u00a0<em>Commercial Code. art. L. 461-5.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn52\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref52' name=\"_ftn52\" title=\"\">[52]<\/a>\u00a0According to the expression of reporter Patrice G\u00e9lard, <em>Rapport sur les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes<\/em>, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn53\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref53' name=\"_ftn53\" title=\"\">[53]<\/a>\u00a0According to the expression used by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, <em>Les 100 mots de la r\u00e9gulation<\/em>, op. cit. p. 118.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn54\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref54' name=\"_ftn54\" title=\"\">[54]<\/a>\u00a0Patrice G\u00e9lard, <em>Rapport sur les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes<\/em>, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn55\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref55' name=\"_ftn55\" title=\"\">[55]<\/a>\u00a0<em>ECJ Decisions, 28 Jun 2005, Dansk Rozindustri, Joined Cases, C-189, 202, 205, 208, 213\/02, Rec.\u00a0II-1681\u00a0; ECJ, 22 May 2008<\/em>,<em> Evonik Degussa<\/em>, <em>Case C-266\/06.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn56\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref56' name=\"_ftn56\" title=\"\">[56]<\/a>\u00a0The AMF or the ARCEP, for example.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn57\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref57' name=\"_ftn57\" title=\"\">[57]<\/a>\u00a0Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat, 11 Dec 1970,<em> Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn58\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref58' name=\"_ftn58\" title=\"\">[58]<\/a>\u00a0Thierry Dahan &#038; Christophe Lemaire, <em>Portait de l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 en jeune fille<\/em>\u2026, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn59\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/div>\n<\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left: 36pt; text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><a href='#_ftnref59' name=\"_ftn59\" title=\"\">[59]<\/a>\u00a0<em>CA Paris, p\u00f4le 5, ch. 5-7, n\u00b0 2009\/00334, 19\u00a0Jan 2010,<\/em> <em>N\u00e9goce de l\u2019acier.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size:14px;\"><\/p>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<div id=\"ftn60\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/div>\n<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref60' name=\"_ftn60\">[60]<\/a>\u00a0Report by MM. Folz, Raysseguier et Schaub, members of the <em>mission sur l\u2019appr\u00e9ciation de la sanction en mati\u00e8re de pratiques anticoncurrentielles<\/em>, submitted to Mrs. Lagarde on 20 Sep 2010.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<div id=\"ftn61\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref61' name=\"_ftn61\">[61]<\/a>&nbsp;Bruno Lasserre, <em>la r\u00e9gulation concurrentielle, un an apr\u00e8s sa r\u00e9forme&nbsp;: un point de vue d\u2019autorit\u00e9 (II)<\/em>, op. cit., point 61.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn62\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref62' name=\"_ftn62\">[62]<\/a>&nbsp;<em>Rapport de la Commission pour la lib\u00e9ration de la croissance fran\u00e7aise<\/em>, submitted to the President of the Republic on 23 Jan 2008, d\u00e9cision 189.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn63\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref63' name=\"_ftn63\">[63]<\/a>&nbsp;Cf. especially Jean-Paul Tran Thiet, <em>Dissuasion et Proportion<\/em>, in <em>Concurrence<\/em>&nbsp;: <em>l\u2019infraction et l\u2019amende<\/em>, <em>Bulletin de l\u2019ILEC n\u00b0418, March 2011<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn64\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref64' name=\"_ftn64\">[64]<\/a>&nbsp;Question asked by a number of authors. Cf. especially Thierry Dahan et Christophe Lemaire, <em>Portait de l\u2019autorit\u00e9 en jeune fille<\/em>\u2026, op. cit.&nbsp;; Denys de B\u00e9chillon &amp; Thierry Tuot, <em>Autorit\u00e9s de r\u00e9gulation&nbsp;: l\u2019\u00e2ge adulte<\/em>, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn65\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref65' name=\"_ftn65\">[65]<\/a>&nbsp;Decree n\u00b0 2009-1377 of November 10, 2009 regarding the organization and the missions of the regional directorates for companies, competition, consumer protection, labor and employment&nbsp;; decree n\u00b0 2009-1484 of December 3, 2009 regarding the same for local directorates.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn66\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref66' name=\"_ftn66\">[66]<\/a>&nbsp;Thierry Dahan &amp; Christophe Lemaire, <em>Portrait de l\u2019Autorit\u00e9 en jeune fille\u2026<\/em>, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn67\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref67' name=\"_ftn67\">[67]<\/a>&nbsp;Commercial Code, article L.464-9.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn68\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref68' name=\"_ftn68\">[68]<\/a>&nbsp;Recommendation 14 from the <em>Rapport d\u2019information sur les Autorit\u00e9s Administratives ind\u00e9pendantes <\/em>by Ren\u00e9 Dosi\u00e8re et Christian Vanneste, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn69\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref69' name=\"_ftn69\">[69]<\/a>&nbsp;Bruno Lasserre,<em> La r\u00e9gulation concurrentielle un an apr\u00e8s sa r\u00e9forme<\/em> <em>(I)<\/em>, op. cit., point 45.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn70\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref70' name=\"_ftn70\">[70]<\/a>&nbsp;<em>Rapport du Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat sur les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes<\/em>, op. cit., p. 347.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn71\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref71' name=\"_ftn71\">[71]<\/a>&nbsp;Recommendation 4 from the<em> Rapport d\u2019information sur les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes<\/em>, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn72\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref72' name=\"_ftn72\">[72]<\/a>&nbsp;Thierry Dahan &amp; Christophe Lemaire, <em>Portrait de l\u2019autorit\u00e9 en jeune fille<\/em>\u2026, op. cit., point 63..<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn73\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref73' name=\"_ftn73\">[73]<\/a>&nbsp;Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, <em>les 100 mots de la r\u00e9gulation<\/em>, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn74\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref74' name=\"_ftn74\">[74]<\/a>&nbsp;<em>Rapport d\u2019information sur les autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes<\/em>, by Ren\u00e9 Dosi\u00e8re &amp; Christian Vanneste, op. cit.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn75\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 36pt;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref75' name=\"_ftn75\">[75]<\/a>&nbsp;Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, <em>Autorit\u00e9s administratives incomprises<\/em>, La Semaine Juridique, Ed. g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, n\u00b0&nbsp;48, 29&nbsp;Nov 2010.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ftn76\">\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><a title=\"\" href='#_ftnref76' name=\"_ftn76\">[76]<\/a>&nbsp;Cf. Jean-Pierre Jouyet, <em>Vers la concurrence r\u00e9gul\u00e9e,<\/em> Concurrences n\u00b0 4-2008, p. 1.<br \/><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\"><br \/><\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"mafr-documents\">\n<h3>Documents<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.mafr.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/mafr-import\/media\/jor\/attachments\/2011\/6\/28\/I_1_31_bis.pdf\">I_1_31_bis.pdf<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.mafr.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/mafr-import\/media\/jor\/attachments\/2012\/1\/4\/I_1_31-2.pdf\">I_1_31-2.pdf<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Two and a half years after having been established by the LME[1], the French Competition Authority has uncontestably acquired its [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[43684],"tags":[39978,39290,39418,39430,39694,39696,39698,39700,39702,39706,39960,39974,39976,39236,40166,40480,40482,40484,41310,42598,42652,42662,43072,43074,43082,43084,38010,36960,37126,37142,37144,37422,37430,37444,37468,37524,37630,37664,37806,36868,38046,38202,38240,38252,38358,38460,38586,38628,38660,38906,38978],"type_de_fiche":[],"matiere":[36740],"class_list":["post-114387","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-jorc-review-archives","tag-executive-branch","tag-consultation","tag-horyzontal-regulation","tag-regulatory-authority","tag-implementation","tag-rulemaking","tag-openness","tag-technical-approach","tag-annual-report","tag-merger-control","tag-investigation","tag-guideline","tag-sector","tag-competition-policy","tag-regulated-industry","tag-european-competition-network","tag-international-competition-network","tag-semantic","tag-due-process","tag-france","tag-equilibrium","tag-ex-ante-ex-post","tag-self-referral","tag-judicial-review","tag-effectivity","tag-organisation-for-economic-co-operation-and-development-oecd","tag-procedure","tag-democracy","tag-methodology","tag-parliament","tag-regulator","tag-commitment","tag-sanction","tag-competition","tag-expert","tag-settlement","tag-negotiation","tag-independent-administrative-authority","tag-competition-authority","tag-legitimacy","tag-power","tag-regulatory-law","tag-independence","tag-accountability","tag-telecommunication","tag-soft-law","tag-goal","tag-efficiency","tag-institution","tag-government","tag-coordination","matiere-economic-law-regulation-and-compliance"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.6 - 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