<\/p>\n
I. RIGHTS, THE MOST EFFECTIVE TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Legal prerogatives held by all subjects of law8<\/a><\/sup>L'on peut même considérer qu'il existe une tautologie entre la notion juridique de "personne" et la notion de "droit subjectif". En effet la personnalité juridique vise l'aptitude à être titulaire de droits subjectifs, au sens actif que sont les prérogatives et au sens passif que sont les obligations. C'est pour être actif dans le commerce juridique que les entreprises sont des "personnes" et c'est pour répondre de leurs actes, en être "responsables" que la jurisprudence a attaché la personnalité morale aux groupements, même dans le silence de la loi, et cela dès le XIXième siècle. V. le volume des Archives de philosophie du Droit <\/em>consacré au thème Le sujet de droit. <\/em><\/span>, rights are today resolutely welcome in regulated economic systems, not because these systems would have been captured by particular interests, according to the general criticism formulated by the French author Carbonnier9<\/a><\/sup>Sur la "pulvérisation" des principes généraux et abstraits, posés par la Loi, en une multitude de "droits subjectifs", Carbonnier, J., Droit et passion du droit sous la Vième République, <\/em>1995. <\/span> regretting the society ceasing to be governed by the Law common to all and equal for all, which has become "pulverized" in a multitude of rights translating the inequality of power which is deployed in the relations between people10<\/a><\/sup>Carbonnier, sous la Vième Répubique<\/em>, 1995. <\/span>, but because they make the regulatory system work better.<\/p>\n Indeed, the multiplication of rights is not a sign of a weakening of the State and its public authorities, it is the new form that the power and sovereignty that the latter takes, distributing these particular powers that are the rights to subjects of Law so that they contribute to the effective implementation of the Regulatory systems (A<\/strong>). This is even clearer in Compliance Law which invented new rights, including the so famous "right to be forgotten" (B<\/strong>).<\/p>\n <\/p>\n A. THE MULTIPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PREROGATIVES IN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS REGULATED BY THE LAW OF REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n There was a time when the power of the State was sufficient to regulate, through regulations, the regulated sectors, to such an extent that one confused "regulations" and "Regulatory Law", while the rights remained in what was the black box for both markets and regulated sectors: enterprises (1<\/span>). Rights were all the more absent as "effective tools" as Competition Law prohibiting the State from fully using the "most absolute" of rights that is the property right 11<\/a><\/sup>L'article 544 du Code civil n'exprimant par sa lettre que ce sur quoi l'on s'accorde, dans une définition de ce droit par la plénitude de la puissance qu'il confère à la personne sur les choses : Le ....<\/em> <\/p>\n 1. The unilateral power of the State, sufficient to govern economic areas<\/p>\n The arrival of rights in Regulatory Law took place with noise, annoyance and great difficulty. This can only be understood by looking back, in what was the construction of Regulation Law, in which Compliance Law is anchored14<\/a><\/sup>Frison-Roche, M.-A., Du Droit de la Régulation au Droit de la Compliance, 2017. Previously the Regulation of the economy by the State, rather a matter of Public Law, made little room for rights which were understood as the particular prerogatives that ordinary people hold to express and defend their interests. In general, Economic Law leaves relatively little room for the prerogatives of the people at the very heart of the functioning of the system, considering in particular that the proper functioning of free Competition is an objective principle of Public Order15<\/a><\/sup>Sur cette question, l'ouvrage de référence est l'ouvrage dirigée par Aurore Laget-Annameyr, L'ordre public économique<\/em>, 2018. <\/span>, which has neither for source nor for consequence a "right to competition"16<\/a><\/sup>Sur l'idée récusée d'un "droit à la concurrence", v. ...<\/span>.<\/p>\n Including at the constitutional level, the system of Competition is thus built on a space, in which people move thanks to a principle of Freedom, Freedom of which they are entitled and which is expressed in particular in Contractual Freedom, the autonomy of their will being sufficient within the limits of the particular laws. Thus the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is generally presented as what concretizes and strengthens the three Freedoms of movement (of people, capital and goods) and not what protects rights17<\/a><\/sup>Ce qui explique l'éloignement pendant des décennies entre l'Europe de l'Union européenne à base de libertés et l'Europe de la Convention européennes des droits de l'Homme à base de droits subjectifs. Aujourd'hui, notamment parce que la Cour de justice change (v. infra<\/em>), les deux Europes se rapprochent pour mettre les êtres humains au centre. C'est notamment par sa définition humaniste que le Droit de la Compliance peut y contribuer (par exemple par la technique du lanceur d'alerte (v. infra<\/em>). <\/span> . In a more general way for the functioning of a liberal economy, the only rights required relate to the goods, the "property right " being besides in the British and American spirit intimate of the freedom of enterprise, which supposes, for the benefit of independent legal persons, a mastery of "things" that have become "goods" by their legal availability, availability and mastery being sufficient to classically define the economic system of property.<\/p>\n The admission of rights seemed even less useful or even relevant in Regulatory Law, in which property and contract are not primary instruments, since Regulatory Law was rather defined as the way for State to insert its concern for the general interest and the long term beyond the individual interests that people transform into these particular prerogatives that are their subjective rights and that they exercise among themselves (personal subjective rights) or over things (real subjective rights) but which it is assumed that they do not express more than their interest. This is how economists identify purely and simply a "right" (in particular the property right) and the control exercised over a situation in an own interest.<\/p>\n Consequently, the Economic Law ruling the spaces, whether spaces of competitive markets or spaces of regulated markets, rather falls under the power of the States (the "public power" to manage the "public service"), which by, their sanctioning power, readjust these spaces in Ex Post if there is a anticompetitive behavior (Competition Law) or which, by their regulatory normative power, organize them in Ex Ante (Regulation Law). Under these conditions, the rights can without damage be absent from Regulatory Law of which constructs the sectors and maintains them in balance. For example Energy Regulatory Law, which fixes the prices or organizes the auctions, or Financial Regulatory Law, which ensures the correct information and represses market abuse. These are always objective principles, implemented by regulations and sanctioned by public authorities. Even when, in a definition where Regulatory mechanisms are only an accessory to Competition18<\/a><\/sup>Voir les trois définition du Droit de la Régulation, soit comme voie de construction d'un marché concurrentiel (en cas de libéralisation d'un secteur) ou comme insertion de gestion des "défaillances de marché", les deux premières conceptions prenant toujours comme idéal le principe de Concurrence, ou bien sa définition comme la mise en équilibre entre un principe de concurrence et d'autres soucis pour des activités dont on pose que cet équilibre est requis, dans son établissement et son maintien dans le temps. L'on peut penser que cette troisième définition est la plus adéquate, notamment en raison de la violence des relations économique. Il est très importante de faire un choix sur ce qu'est le Droit de la Régulation, dans la mesure où le Droit de la Compliance est lui-même l'internalisation dans les "opérateurs cruciaux" du Droit de la Régulation. La troisième définition de la Régulation étant celle qui prend en considération l'être humain de la façon la plus centrale, c'est celle-là qui doit être considérée, et insérée de gré ou de force dans les entreprises, dans une conception elle-aussi humaniste du Droit de la Compliance. <\/span>, Regulation Law is only defined as the means by which a competitive market is established, Regulation being only what accompanies liberalization, rights are not required no more since Competition Law does not do much more room to rights.<\/p>\n Indeed, the property right being itself reduced to the power to dispose of goods, associated with contractual freedom, this mastery is put at the service of the circulation of goods. Even more, while the State enterprise – by the control given by the holding of a share of the capital – could have enabled the State to regulate a sector via a "crucial operator", Competition Authorities, by neutralizing the specificity of the 'State-shareholder19<\/a><\/sup>Sur l'Etat-actionnaire, empêché d'être un instrument de Régulation, v. Larget, A.... ; ... 2019, ....<\/span> enjoin State to behave like an ordinary investor, prohibit it from using the political power of property rights with political power, through the power to vote in the companies and to have seats in the boards. <\/p>\n <\/p>\n 2. The de jure<\/em> admission of classic rights, a consequence of the integration of Regulation and Compliance as elements of Rule of Law<\/span><\/p>\n The changes most often come from Procedure. No doubt because it is in this gentle way of doing20<\/a><\/sup>Sur la justice définie par les "façons de faire", v. Baranès, W. et Frison-Roche, M.-A., La justice, <\/em>....<\/span> that the deepest movements are made. This also shows that the opposition often highlighted between Civil Law and Common Law is not so relevant since the judge, third to the situation to be resolved, is in one and the other of the two systems at the center. of these and that it is always necessary to take this route that is Procedure to reach the master of systems that is the judge, master hidden in the first system (Civil Law), openly acting in the second one (Common Law), but always master. Anymay, in France, so often presented as a Civil Law system, the Conseil d'\u00c9tat <\/em>(French Supreme Administrative Court) , an administrative jurisdiction, does not hide much to openly assert itself as being the "Regulator of regulators" in Regulatory Law21<\/a><\/sup>Conseil d'Etat, Le juge administratif et les Autorités de régulation économique<\/em>, 2016. <\/span>. <\/span><\/p>\n When in France the Cour de cassation<\/em> (French Supreme Judicial Court) by the Oury judgment of February 5, 1999<\/a> qualified the regulatory authorities as a "court", it injected into all the regulated sectors, in which the Regulator is itself the master, all procedural rights: first of all, the right to seize the regulatory authority, the right to debate and defend oneself, the right to benefit from its objective impartiality, the right to challenge its decision, including before a judicial court. This first revelation of the sort of naked King that is the distinction between Private Law and Public Law, fine clothes whose vision the Law of Compliance completes to dissolve for better restore the ambitions that the State can claim to express since it sets the goals and for companies to achieve them, put the procedural rights at the center of regulated systems.<\/p>\n More particularly, the procedural right to challenge in Ex Post what the State says in its task as an architect of the sectors leads to a corpus of case law on Regulatory Law and has produced, in all the regulated sectors, a "cognitive Ex Ante"22<\/a><\/sup>Sur la notion de 'Ex Ante cognitif", v. ...<\/span> <\/span>, a phenomenon of common construction of rules between public Authorities and privates enterprises, which is no longer contested, co-building even approved.<\/p>\n The phenomenon is increased in Compliance Law, the latter being an extension of Regulation Law. The procedural rights of the subjects of law that are the enterprises, very developed because of the part of the "repressive tools" in this branch of the Law23<\/a><\/sup>V. par ex. Coppens, K., ....<\/span> accompany the "jurisdictionalization of Compliance"24<\/a><\/sup>V. le cycle de colloques "La juridictionnalisation de la Compliance", 2021. <\/span>, leading in particular to the enterprise to become a judge of itself25<\/a><\/sup>Sur l'entreprise juge d'elle-même par l'effet du Droit de la Compliance, v. ...., Lyon, 8 avril 2021. <\/span>. <\/p>\n These rights have therefore entered in a relatively violent way into the mechanisms of Regulation and Compliance, but are anchored in the simple principle according to which these mechanisms are built in the Rule of Law. As the Court of Justice of the European Union regularly reminds, all of these instruments being of a legal nature, and having to be articulated between them!26<\/a><\/sup>Sur l'articulation des "outils de compliance" entre eux, car ils ne peuvent pas s'additionner les uns sur les autres, sans corrélation, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., ....<\/span>, they cannot be conceived without a common anchoring that to be the Rule of Law. Except to maintain that Regulation and Compliance would not belong to Law, and to read proposals in particular on the prowess expected from machines that are presented as "intelligent" leading to allegations in this sense (pure processes replacing Law), Regulation Law and Compliance Law are branches of Law, which have as common roots the Rule of Law.<\/p>\n Rule of Law has at its heart procedural rights. The courts have therefore made them appear in the positive Law of both branches, Public and Private Law, in a way acquired in Regulatory Law, in a new way for Compliance Law, a branch currently under development. If we rule out reducing Regulation and Compliance to empty processes and tie them to the principle of Rule of Law, a principle which is common to Europe and the United States but which is not necessarily shared with all the other areas of the world which on the contrary appreciate the ex ante design of economic sectors and the proven obedience of all to the rules, then it is necessary to develop the procedural rights.<\/p>\n For that, it is necessary to develop and put at the center the jurisprudence of the constitutional courts, since these are above all guardians of the rights. It is just the beginning of this movement.<\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n 3. The emergence of rights renewed or specific to Compliance Law: from the "right of access" to the "right to be forgotten"<\/span><\/p>\n By another movement, Regulation Law then Compliance Law created in any case new rights, prerogatives offered by Law to people dealing with regulated situations.<\/p>\n For example the "right to electricity"27<\/a><\/sup>Sur "le droit à l'électricité", v. par ex. Frison-Roche M.-A., "Droit de l'électricité, droit à l'électricité", ....<\/span> which in the French law of February 10, 2000 was designed by the Legislator, giving everyone the prerogative to receive this essential good, not by the effect of a commitment of 'a contracting party, but by a definitively acquired prerogative. This thus produces for each a right to enter a contract, certain clauses of which are implied by this right of legal origin. Such insertion of a right as the source of the supplier's obligations considerably changes the legal regime 28<\/a><\/sup>Il est résulte une mixité des clauses contractuelles, certaines étant liées à ce droit, dont la volonté des parties ne peuvent pas entièrement disposer, et d'autres par lesquelles les parties au contrat peuvent ajouter et aménager. La façon dont le juge ou l'Autorité de régulation tranche un différent entre les parties ou sanctionne une inexécution change suivant la nature de diverses stipulations. <\/span>.<\/p>\n First of all, the right holder can rely on it even though he\/she is not in a position to take advantage of his\/she sole contractual freedom to enter into a contractual relationship, then to request the execution of the commitments of his\/her contractor even if he\/she does not honor his\/her own, while the contractual relationship is by nature commutative: concretely and for example entering into an electricity supply contract and not being cut off even if he\/she does not pay the bills.<\/p>\n What is offered in the electrical field, because there is set by Law a "right to electricity" which structures the sector, could be transposed for any essential good? A priori no, because the "right of access" only exists concerning monopoly essential infrastructures for the benefit of third parties and there is no such right of access to every essential goods, the decision to organize access to public goods, such as knowledge through access to education for all, referring to public policies and not to rights29<\/a><\/sup>V. d'une façon générale, L'accès <\/em><\/span>. <\/p>\n The question of the existence of a right of access which would be equivalent to a right to a free supply nevertheless arises in these terms, and with acuity, in the Regulatory perspective of digital space, since it is indeed in the name of the user's right of access of the Internet that might be established the obligation to open networks and content to everyone, possibly without financial compensation, thus giving a particular meaning to the principle of Neutrality. Indeed in an extreme conception, if the principle of Neutrality went beyond the objective principle of an "open Internet", guaranteed by the texts30<\/a><\/sup>Par exemple le Règlement européen de 2016 sur "L'internet ouvert" qui offre à l'utilisateur de pouvoir « <\/span>d’accéder aux informations et aux contenus et de les diffuser, d’utiliser et de fournir des applications et des services et d’utiliser les équipements terminaux de leur choix, quel que soit le lieu où se trouve l’utilisateur final ou le fournisseur, et quels que soient le lieu, l’origine ou la destination de l’information, du contenu, de l’application ou du service, par l’intermédiaire de leur service d’accès à l’internet<\/em> ». <\/span><\/span>, but referred to a substantial right that any Internet user would have to access at any time at the same speed, the whole system is changed. Indeed, the contracts which are concluded between the access providers and the Net surfers cannot stipulate different prices according to the quality of this access since this right of access thus enriched by the Law would be already fully acquired, a contractual stipulation does not can come nor reduce it nor to enrich it.<\/p>\n For the moment, in particular because in a liberal system it is the parties who by the power of contract give rise to rights and obligations and not the Law, the Law being certainly the third party necessary for the bilateral relationship but not the one which alone holds the pen, rights on the one hand remain few in the regulated systems and on the other hand retain the mark of their origin. Indeed, this unilateralism traditionally characterizing Regulatory Law continues31<\/a><\/sup>v. plus haut, I.A.1,....<\/span>, since the contract will only be the legal implementation of this right conferred by Law on all. This therefore results in supply obligations linked to the persistent notion of Public Service.<\/p>\n Even more and more generally, the "right of access", which is an essential right in regulatory systems, is itself of legal origin, because it is the "right of access to essential infrastructures", the center of all the Regulation of the so-called" network sectors", the natural monopoly of infrastructures being thus admitted and supervised by the public Regulatory Authoity. This explains why both the realization of the "right of access" takes the form of an "access contract" and that its dispute is nevertheless attributed to the knowledge of the administrative Regulatory Authority.<\/p>\n This explains why in these so-called "network sectors", in particular Energy and Telecommunications, the Regulatory Authority is endowed with the power to settle disputes to find concrete solutions by implementation of access contracts32<\/a><\/sup>V. Richet, L., Le pouvoir de réglement des différents ...<\/span>, because access is a central mechanism of Regulation of the sector. This mix justifye in the French juridictionnal organization that the control of this Regulation work carried out by these administrative authorities nevertheless falls within the knowledge of the Paris Court of Appeal, a judicial jurisdiction.<\/p>\n This jurisdictional organization, which seems incomprehensible, almost a "faulty"33<\/a><\/sup>V. l'analyse cohérente de Pierre Delvolvé, La cour d'appel de Paris, juridiction administrative<\/em>, ....<\/span>, to such an extent that some ask that, in a kind of welcome back to what would more coherent, this type of litigation be known by the only administrative courts, shows on the contrary that Regulation Law gives way to the dynamism of the actors, through their rights, private actors who want to enter the networks, for example.<\/p>\n Concerning Compliance Law, because it extends Regulation in the enterprises themselves, the "access rights" are taking more and more autonomy. In the coming years, for example, the "right of access" to decision-making functions in companies, for categories of people who do not statistically have access to them, will be stronger. In such a case, public policies of incentive or constraint through quotas would give way to rights, protected by courts.<\/p>\n Moreover, Compliance Law has almost made its appearance through rights!<\/p>\n Indeed, it is by the judgment of June 13, 2014, Google Spain<\/em>, that the Court of Justice of the European Union34<\/a><\/sup>Sur l'arrêt Google Spain<\/em>, point de départ du Droit européen de la Compliance, lire Koen Laernart, ....<\/span> established Compliance Law by forcing a crucial digital operator to technically destroy the access to Information. In the same way that Regulation Law had built by Law the right of access, Compliance Law has built by Case Law the right to non-access. This right called since "the right to be forgotten" is an extraordinary right since it allows a person to disappear in this digital world where henceforth everything is preserved eternally.<\/p>\n The digitization of the world has not only put it "into numbers"35<\/a><\/sup>Supiot, A., La gouvernance par les nombres<\/em>, 2015. <\/span>, but has also disembodied it, as effectively as Finance and Competition had done by reducing things to their only cost and price, and has done what did not had never been done before: Digital has made time disappear. This violation of the natural order of things has justifed the injection of the only weapon that human beings have against this disappearance of time: rights.<\/p>\n For instance, death is certainly feared by everyone but it is also what protects everyone because in this way what we have done is forgotten, our loved ones being spared the endless memory that would be kept of their ancestors. But because Digital techniques preserve all, legislations haved created what is qualified as the "right to digital death" 36<\/a><\/sup>For instance in France the Loi pour une République Numérique.<\/em> It thus appears through this last example that we are today so helpless face of this new technological power that only rights can be an effective protection. They are therefore today the first "tools" of Compliance Law.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n B. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE BLOOMING OF RIGHTS THROUGH THE CONCRETE CONCRETIZATION OF MONUMENTAL GOALS: RIGHT AS A PURE TOOL<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Even if one does not appreciate the litigants who multiply in the "contentious societies"37<\/a><\/sup>Sur la critique par ailleurs fondée de la "société contentieuse", visant les Etats-Unis, Cadiet, L., La spectre de la société contentieuse, <\/span> or that one fears the government of judges with increasing influence, whose presence is all the more disapproved if these judges are "foreign"38<\/a><\/sup>Grief implicite ou explicite qui frappe d'ailleurs l'ensemble du Droit de la Compliance (Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le Droit de de la Compliance, 2016). Indeed, such prerogatives must be distributed for obtaining the effectiveness not only of the means but also of the goals, since the means are themselves only tools. The use of persons as means is only a return to Roman Law, which created the notion of personality as a tool (persona <\/em>being a mask, a theatrical megaphone) without direct consideration for the human being. (the inseparability of the two coming later41<\/a><\/sup>Foucault, M., Le sujet <\/em>....<\/span>), for making trade and the institutions efficient functioning42<\/a><\/sup>Ellul, J. ..., in Le sujet de droit<\/em>, ....<\/span>. In this, English having replaced Latin, rights attached to any subject of Law constitute the perfect example of private enforcement (1<\/span>). This is imperative for Information, Compliance Law being a system of centralization and transmission of Information, which leads to giving rights to those who seek Information and transmit it, as does the whistleblower, key figure in this branch of Law (2<\/span>). In a system struggling to achieve its goals, taking charge of rights by others would be effective, as shown by the class action mechanism, but the evolution, as for the whistleblower, is slow (3<\/span>).<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 1. Rights, a technique of "private enforcement"<\/span><\/p>\n Compliance Law only finds its consistency and unity through the monumental goals that define it43<\/a><\/sup>Frison-Roche, M.-A., l'unité des outils ....<\/span>. The effectiveness of its various tools is therefore decisive. The application of the Law it is not spontaneous, except that the subjects of Law are inhabited by the love of Laws postulated by Rousseau, or because the legal prescription resulting from the text or of the contract would correspond exactly to their particular interests, in particular because the authors of this one conceived it through an incentive mechanism44<\/a><\/sup>Tardieu, H., ....<\/span>. Law requires force, through techniques of enforcement. The link between Law and force is so significant that it is common to define Law by the force which is attached to the rule, but it is about a potential force, the "binding force" and not the effective force. effective leading to an effective implementation. The "force publique", the public enforcement, is therefore required.<\/p>\n Without developing more this point, Compliance Law of Compliance, because it is concentrated in global "monumental goals", poses that their effective achievement is not a question which is secondary to the enactment of the rule but is first, since the various compliance techniques developed are themselves only tools. However, these goals are not only gigantic, for example to put an end to corruption, or to establish equality between women and men, but they are not limited to the territory in which the State deploys its power (which is why Compliance Law extraterritoriality finds its legitimacy).<\/p>\n Due to the weakness of public enforcement in terms of Compliance, a weakness inherent in its definition (goals so monumental…), private enforcement will be much more effective. Indeed, if faced with powerful American enterprises accumulating Information and building an industry on these data, Law firstly creates a right of control of this data by the person who is "concerned", which is the definition of "personal data", then Law secondly creates a substantial right to be forgotten, which is activated by its association with a right of access to the judge, the Regulatory Authority itself being juridictionalized to fulfill this office, all the Regulatory Law could work beyond territories, inside enterprises by Compliance Law: this is how the Regulation of the digital space, which seemed unattainable other than through the ethical spontaneity of the companies that designed and mastered it, becomes possible45<\/a><\/sup>V. d'une façon générale, Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'apport du Droit de la Compliance à la gouvernance d'Internet<\/em>, 2019. Depuis la rédaction de ce rapport qui décrit ce mouvement disciplinant, les lois multipliant les droits subjectifs et les jurisprudences leur donnant effet se sont multipliés. <\/span>. <\/p>\n Thus all Compliance Law is being transformed by the insertion in each person of substantive rights, to which is associated procedural rights, for making effective a Regulation Law exhausted by the power allowed by the immateriality of technologies. It is also in this direction that the American legislator went by the Dodd-Frank Act<\/em> of 2010, the exact title of which is Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act<\/em>, which in the comprehensive reform of the Financial Markets Regulatory Law distributes rights to each investor and for their effectiveness creates a specific institution, ensuring the protection of their rights, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)<\/a><\/em>. This agency provides consumers of financial products with Information to protect them in Ex Ante and allow them to act in Ex Post if their rights have been infringed.<\/p>\n More generally, Behavioral Economics consists of betting on people by providing them with Information, by giving them an interest in acting, in the more concrete sense that Procedural Law gives to the general remarks of the theory of incentives. The famous nudge theory46<\/a><\/sup>Sur la prise en considération de cette conception et d'une façon plus générale des apports de l'économie comportementale en Droit de la Compliance, précisément lorsque le Droit de la Régulation trouve ses limites en raison des territoires et que le Droit de la Compliance, qui le prolonge et le dépasse, peut constituer une solution pour construire en Ex Ante des Régulations, v. Rapp, L. ....<\/span> <\/em> has many points of contact with Procedural Law …and often requires a procedural right: because for an incentive to obtain Information shall be active, it often needed to transform the incentive into a right to be informed, to produce an obligation for someone to satisfy it, while doubling that by a right to take legal action before a court, or a Regulatory or Supervisory Authority for obtaining it by constraint.<\/p>\n Because Compliance Law is based on Information47<\/a><\/sup>Sur le lien entre Compliance et Information, v. son rapport paradoxal puisque le Droit de la Compliance implique soit le droit de transmettre, soit le droit de bloquer toute transmission, le Droit de la Compliance donnant effectivité à chacun de ces deux droits subjectifs parfois pour une bonne information. Voir par exemple à propos d'une information à caractère personnel, dont la connaissance serait pourtant pertinente pour la sanction de comportements anticoncurrentiels, v. l'ordonnance rendue par le président du Tribunal de l'Union européenne le 29 octobre 2020, dans la contestation par Facebook de l'ordre de transmission d'informations émis par la Commission européenne à son encontre, .....<\/span>, Compliance Law has increased this private enforcement mechanism by inventing a new and very specific character: the whistleblower. But for that, it was also necessary to invent for the benefit of the latter a new right: a right to protection.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 2. The particular quarrel around the rights of the Information provider: the activation of the whistleblower<\/span><\/p>\n The whistleblower is a famous and contested character. Its usefulness is recognized, since he\/she transmits Information that would have remained inaccessible without him\/her. This character of great potential utility will however only be active if he\/her is endowed with two rights: firstly a right to protection, secondly a right to financial retribution. Both have been contested. They have not, moreover, been conferred in an equal manner and the effectiveness of Compliance Law as an information system to make monumental goals effective, for example the protection of women in enterprises suffers from it.<\/p>\n Without going back to its description from top to bottom48<\/a><\/sup>Pour une description en droit comparé du lanceur d'alerte, v. ..., et notamment Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'impossible unicité du lanceur d'alerte....<\/span>, two elements should be highlighted here. First of all, for instance the French law known as "Sapin 2" which establishes the status of the lanceur d'alerte <\/em>(whistleblower), anticipating the European movement which does nothing more in this respect compared to French law49<\/a><\/sup>Directive d'octobre 2019 sur la protection du lanceur d'alerte. <\/span>, defines the whistleblower by the protection due to him\/her. Thus the protection of the one who transmits information, in particular against the one on whom he depends, for example his\/her employer, whose faulty behavior he\/she may have revealed, is not included in the whistleblower's simple regime but in his\/her very definition. Far from being a drafting error, this legal definition of the whistleblower by his\/her "right to protection" is well founded, because if he\/sher is not protected, he\/she will not transmit the Information. This right to protection is all the more required as certain legislations, including French law, have chosen to oblige the informed person to transmit the information within the enterprise before being authorized to communicate outside50<\/a><\/sup>Il est d'ailleurs remarquable que l'étude menée par le Conseil d'Etat sur le lanceur d'alerte à l'occasion de la loi dite "Sapin 2", est plutôt réservée sur le mécanisme et que si dans sa version française cet examen qualifie l'ensemble par "Le droit d'alerte : ..." , cette référence à un droit subjectif disparait dans la traduction anglaise de l'étude, également disponible sur le site du Conseil d'Etat dont l'intitulé est : "Whistleblowing: reporting, handling and protecting". <\/span>. <\/p>\n The second right, even more contested, is the "right to remuneration". In the United States, the laws, because reasoning from utility, have conferred this financial right to remuneration51<\/a><\/sup>Le droit britannique exclut le mécanisme de récompense mais admet la compensation des pertes subies par le whistleblower<\/em> (Public Interest Disclosure Act, <\/em>1998).<\/span>. At the federal level, it is the same Dodd-Frank<\/em> Act which organizes a specifi program to protect whistleblowers, entrusted to a special office in the Securities & Exchanges Commission (SEC)<\/em>!52<\/a><\/sup>La SEC rend compte chaque année de l'effectivité et de l'efficacité du travail du ... office <\/em>. Sur le rapport rendu pour 2020, v. Frison-Roche, M.-A., .... ; le succès du programme est mesuré à la hauteur des récompenses attribuées. <\/span><\/em>, which allocates financial rewards to whistleblowers, the SEC sending annually a public report to the US Congress, assessing the success of the whistleblowing mechanism at the aggregate amount of these rewards53<\/a><\/sup>Lire l'article intéressant de Johanna Schwartz Miralles: Les récompenses financières des lanceurs d'alerte portent-elles atteinte aux droits fondamentaux ? Le cas américain, in Les lanceurs d'alerte et les droits de l'homme. Apport du droit comparé et international<\/em>, Revue des droits de l'homme, 2016, <\/span>. <\/p>\n European law, in particular in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights but also in the European Directive of October 2019 strengthening the protection of whistleblowers, refuses to recognize this whistleblower "right to be remunerated", many considering that the only "ethical alert" is the one without money. To stay with the only question of the effectiveness of rights, it is accepted that as long as Europe does not recognize the holder of information, whose transmission could endanger him\/her, the benefit of not only a right to protection but still a right to remuneration, the system will lack Information.<\/p>\n The perspective is even clearer when it comes to the procedural right of action, because the all efficiency of the system presupposes its effectiveness.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 3. The particular favor provided to collective mechanisms serving individual rights: class action<\/span><\/p>\n Indeed, by definition a legal mechanism understood as a tool only makes sense through its effective use (i.e. used) and efficient use (i.e. producing the expected concrete effects, in relation to the goals aimed by whoever built the mechanisme54<\/a><\/sup>Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'unicité des outils ...<\/span>). <\/p>\n Substantive rights depend in their realization on the potential credible intervention of courts , Regulator and Supervisor being assimilated by Law to a "court" since it sanctions the failures , settles the disputes and builds Case Law. As procedural rights were the first to enter the Regulation and Compliance systems55<\/a><\/sup>V. supra<\/em> sur l'entrée des droits subjectifs processuels dans le Droit de la Régulation. <\/span>, the whole structure of Regulation and Compliance Law therefore depends on the effectiveness of the procedural rights of action.<\/p>\n However, the people who are entitled to act in Compliance Law are hardly in a position to do so, because they are not informed of the substantive rights with which Law has endowed them, or even that, knowing them, they do not have the financial means to claim them56<\/a><\/sup>En cela, la définition très classique, plutôt issue du Droit public, du droit d'action comme étant le droit substantiel "en l'état de guerre" avait de la pertinence, avant qu'elle ne soit plutôt oubliée au profit de la conception, mise en lumière par Motulsky, insérée dans le Droit positif d'un droit subjectif processuel autonome du droit subjectif substantiel qui sera l'objet d'un jugement. La jurisprudence, notamment celle de la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme, fait tout de même un lien entre les deux en validant l'absence de droit d'action lorsque la personne qui prétend saisir le juge n'a manifestement aucun droit substantiel dont elle pourrait se prévaloir. <\/span>, or the legal situation does not lend themselves to it.<\/p>\n
\n\nCette définition est maintenue par la jurisprudence constitutionnelle. <\/span> to prosecute the general interest through public enterprises12<\/a><\/sup>Sur la question immense de la propriété publique et des entreprises publiques, dans leur rapport avec l'intérêt général et la régulation des secteurs, question qui ne sera pas abordée ici car excédant le champ de cette étude centrée sur le Droit de la Compliance, v. not. Sauvé, J.-M., Les entreprises publiques, 2018. <\/span>, while case law admitted to others the use of the procedural right of action against the State, obliged it to be accountable for the decisions taken by Regulators who have nevertheless become independent from it13<\/a><\/sup>Sur la responsabilité de l'Etat du fait des Autorités de Régulation et de Supervision, pourtant Autorités qui, d'une façon consubstantielle et en application d'une règle constitutionnelle, ne peuvent être qu'indépendantes du Gouvernement qui conduit l'action publique économique des secteurs, sujet très important puisque l'obligation de répondre est l'autre face des droits (v. infra<\/em>) mais qui ne sera pas non plus abordé en tant que tel dans cette présente étude centrée sur le Droit de la Compliance, v. par exemple, Frison-Roche, M.-A., ....<\/span>. Let us recognize that there is reason, for the legislative and executive powers, to doubt the benefit brought by rights in the systems of public regulation … This changed when the Regulation Law has been affected by the procedural Law (2<\/span>).<\/p>\n
\n\nMême s'il est vrai que le Droit de la Compliance s'est développé depuis d'une façon autonome (Le Droit de la Compliance, au-delà du Droit de la Régulation, 2019), cet ancrage explique beaucoup de ses mécanismes. <\/span>.<\/p>\n
\n\nBut if it is not the case, it could be a "terrible legal mess" (for instance, in Japan). <\/span> , sort of legal way to make the right to be forgotten coincide with the natural disappearance which is death, forcing digital operators to erase the accounts of deceased people on social networks. <\/p>\n
\n\nV. le développement d'un tel grief par le parlementaire A. Gauvain, ....<\/span>, the topic of the extraterritoriality of Compliance Law often intersecting with the illegitimacy of judges39<\/a><\/sup>Sur le croisement entre la critique du pouvoir juridictionnel dans le Droit de la compliance et la critique de l'application extraterritorial du Droit américain de la Compliance (appliquée par les juridictions américaines), v. ....<\/span>, the multiplication of rights leading by nature to powerful judges since they give concrete form to these rights40<\/a><\/sup>Sur le jugement comme mode de génération des droits subjectifs, la démonstration a été faite par le thèse de Motulsky : Principes de réalisation méthode du droit. Elements général des droits subjectifs<\/em>, 1948. <\/span>, rights are justified as "Compliance Tools" in that they make possible to achieve monumental goals, which States are struggling to achieve.<\/p>\n