Food for thoughts

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Référence complète : Archives de Philosophie du Droit (APD), Le droit international, tome 32, ed. Sirey, 1987, 442 p.

 

Lire la table des matières.

Lire les résumés des articles en langue anglais.

 

Voir la présentation d'autres tomes des Archives de Philosophie du Droit.

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Référence complète : Salah, M., La mondialisation vue de l'Islam, in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, La mondialisation entre illusion et utopie, tome 47, Dalloz, 2003, 27-54.

 

La mondialisation apparaît comme une occidentalisation des cultures et du droit. L'Islam qui prend forme juridique devrait se l'approprier sans se dénaturer. La réussite d'un tel processus difficile dépendra de la qualité de la régulation qui sera mise en place.

 

Lire une présentation générale de l'ouvrage dans lequel l'article a été publié.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Legally, the State is a public law subject defined by territory, people and institutions. It acts in the international space and emits norms. Politically, it has the legitimacy required to express the will of the social body and to exercise the violence of which it deprives the other subjects of law. It is often recognizable by its power: its use of public force, its budgetary power, its jurisdictional power. These three powers, declining or being challenged by private, international and more satisfying mechanisms, some predicted the disappearance of the State, to deplore it or to dance on its corpse.

With such a background, in current theories of Regulation, primarily constructed by economic thought and at first sight one might say that the State is above all the enemy. And this for two main reasons. The first is theoretical and of a negative nature. The advocates of the theory of regulation deny the State the political qualities set out above. The State would not be a "person" but rather a group of individuals, civil servants, elected officials and other concrete human beings, expressing nothing but their particular interests, coming into conflict with other interests, and using their powers to serve the former rather than the latter as everyone else. The Regulation theory, adjoining the theory of the agency, is then aimed at controlling public agents and elected representatives in whom there is no reason to trust a priori.

The second reason is practical and positive. The State would not be a "person" but an organization. Here we find the same perspective as for the concept of enterprise, which classical lawyers conceive as a person or a group of people, while economists who conceive of the world through the market represent it as an organization. The state as an organization should be "efficient" or even "optimal". It is then the pragmatic function of the Regulation Law. When it is governed by traditional law, entangled by that it would be an almost religious illusions of the general interest, or even the social contract, it is suboptimal. The Regulation purpose is about making it more effective.

To this end, as an organization, the State is divided into independent regulatory agencies or independent administrative authorities that manage the subjects as close as possible, which is fortunate in reducing the asymmetry of information and in reviving trust in a direct link. The unitary, distant and arrogant State is abandoned for a flexible and pragmatic conception of a strategic state (without capital ...) that would finally have understood that it is an organization like any other ...

Competition law adopts this conception of the State, which it posed from the beginning that it was an economic operator like any other. This is how this conception which would be  more "neutral" of the world is often presented.

Successive crises, whether sanitary or financial, have produced a pendulum effect.

Now, the notions of general interest or common goods are credited of an autonomous value, and the necessity of surpassing immediate interests and of finding persons to bear superior interests or to take charge of the interests of others, even a non-immediate one, emerged.

Thus, the State or the public authority, reappears in the globalization. The Compliance Law or the Corporal Social Responsibility of the crucial companies are converging towards a consideration of the State, which can not be reduced to a pure and simple organization receptacle of externalities.

 

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Référence complète : Teubner, G., L'auto-constitutionnalisation des entreprises transnationales ? Sur les rapports entres les codes de conduite "privés" et "publics" des entreprises, in Supiot, A. (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, p.71-83.

 

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent lire l'article via le Drive  de Sciences po, dans le dossier MAFR - Régulation

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The goal for which a mechanism, a solution an institution or a rule is adopted, instituted or elaborated, is in principle external to them. Knowledge of this goal is a tool to better understand them and is only that.

On the contrary, in Regulation Law, the goal is the heart itself. By definition, Regulation Law is a set of instruments that articulate to take their meaning in relation to a goal. Moreover, these instruments are legitimate to represent a constraint only because they realize a goal which is itself legitimate. The interpretation of Regulation Law is based on the aims pursued: the reasoning is teleological.

This teleological nature explains that efficiency is no longer merely a concern - as for ordinary legal mechanisms, but rather a principle of Regulation Law. It explains the welcome, especially through the European Union Law of the theory of the useful effect. This link between rules, which are only means, and aims, refers to the principle of proportionality, which requires that constraints and exceptions be applied only when they are necessary, proportionality being the form off the classic principle of necessity.

Because the aim is the center, it must be expressed by the author of the Regulation standards, and this is all the more so if they are of a political nature, being not limited to mitigating technical failures of markets. This goal can be varied: the management of systemic risks, but also the consideration of the fundamental rights of people, the preservation of the environment, public health, civilization, education, etc. The silence of the legislature, which limits itself to the making of rules whereas these are merely instruments, without explicating the goal whereas the latter is a political decision, is a fault in the legislative art.

Moreover, in order that the person who applies the Regulation norm, in particular the Regulator and the Judge, has no excessive margin for interpretation and does not substitute for political power, the author of the Regulation norm needs to aim specifically for one goal : in this way, the one who applies the norm will be constrained. Or, if the author targets several purposes, then he must articulate them in relation to each other, by hierarchizing them for example. If he fails to do so, the institution which applies the regulatory standards will itself have to choose the purpose and exercise a power which he does not possess.

This express designation of purpose has been made for the European Banking Union,  this Regulation and Supervision construction, whose primary aim is to prevent systemic risks and resolve crises. Similarly, the purpose of the Regulation of essentiel infrastructures is to provide third parties access to the network. Similarly, in the case of a transitional regulation introduced following liberalization, the aim is to establish competition, the principle of which has been declared by the liberalization law. When this is not clearly stated, there is a lapse in the legislative art.

 

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" is important. In the systems of Continental Law, or still called under Roman-Germanic Law, or even called Civil Law systems, it is even around it that legal systems are built: it can be a basic distinction, a summa divisio, as it it in the Civil Law systems. In the so-called Common Law or Anglo-American systems, the distinction is less fundamental, but it remains, justifying in particular that the rules and disputes concerning the administration call for special rules and are apprehended by special tribunals.

In principle, this distinction is based on the nature of the persons whose legal situation is examined. Under"Public Law" a legal situation involving a person who is itself a public-law entity: the State, a local authority, a public undertaking, etc. That is why, for example, the contract which may be concluded will be of public law, and the judge who may be seized of it will be an administrative court. If the situation does not involve a person governed by public law, then it will be governed by "Private Law". There are a thousand exceptions, but this is the starting and basic and fondamental principle.

Two essential remarks, bearing a system of values, explaining that the systems of Civil Law and Common Law are in fact confronting each other.

The two bodies of rules and institutions are not of equal strength because one of the categories is "closed", corresponding to one criterion (the "public person"), while the other is open: Public Law is a closed category; on the contrary, Private law becomes "active" as soon as there is no public person (a "private person" who or which must define himself or itself as a "non-public person").

One can consider this articulation between Public Law and Private Law in two ways, radically opposed. It may express a mark of inferiority in disfavour of private law: we are all "ordinary" persons in "ordinary" situations with "ordinary" activities (this will be the French conception ....). On the contrary, Public Law is the mark of the State, of Public Order, of Sovereignty, of public power, of the general will, in the interstices of which individuals slip in to act and satisfy their small particular interests

On the contrary, Private Law can be considered as the expression of the "common law": people are free and do what they want, through ownership and contract. As an exception and because they have elected people to do so, the rulers (whom they control), by exception, enact norms that constrain them. But this is an exception, since repression - public law and criminal law, which has the same status in this respect - is only a tribute to the freedom of persons, since this freedom remains wholly in the form of the private enterprise on the market.

It is then measured that the articulation between Public and Private Law profoundly reflects a philosophy and a political position. If it is considered that Regulation is the underlying order by which the Sovereign allows the deployment of his subjects who also benefit from a long-term policy constructed by the autonomous and measured political will, then Public Law in Is the master, the Regulation Law expressing a renewed search for efficiency, this but only this. If we believe that Regulation is whereby economic rationality manages to protect persons and companies from risks and to compensate for market failures, a market whose liberal principle remains the ideal, then Private Law is the core, whith contract and private property as basis tools.

France and the Latin countries adhere rather to this metaphysics of values which entrusts to the Public Authorities and the State the legitimacy and the power to express the general interest by Public Law, Regulators and Constitutional Courts, expressing it on a technical form renewed by the Regulatory tools: incitations, soft law, etc. The legal systems whose history draws on British history put more trust in the person of the entrepreneur and conceive of Regulation Law as an efficient outsourcing of functions to administrations that are efficient, informed and impartial.

Certainly, in the technical daily of the Law of Regulation and following the different sectors, Public and Private Law mix up:  public companies take the form of publicly traded companies under private law or private companies will be entrusted with missions of public service, instituting them as second-level regulators as are the infrastructure network operators.

But the fundamental conception of systems (rooted in the history of the people) and practice marry. In the silence of regulations (and the more they are gossiping and the more the judge must interpret them, which amounts to a "silence"), what sense to give to the system?

To take only a few questions, frequent in practice:

  •      What judge to seize? The administrative judge or the civil judge? What is the "natural judge" of the Regulatory Law?
  •      What standard to apply? The contractual will? The implicit will of the legislator? What is the "natural author" of the Law of Regulation?
  •      Does the silence of the text prohibit action for operators or on the contrary does silence mean their freedom to act?

The absence of a firm and shared definition of what is the Law of Regulation does not facilitate practice. Hesitations in translations from one language to another increase confusion.

For the time being, there is a tendency to refer to Public Law in the sectors where whe take precedence over public operators' monopolies, such as telecommunications, energy, railways, air and postal services, and to refer to Private Law in the sectors which have long been the subject of competition between operators, namely banking, finance and insurance.

It should be recognized that the criterion of distinction has little economic rationale. The notion of risk would be a clearer and more manageable criterion. But it would then lead to a greater challenge to the distinction between Public and Private Law. Because the Law of Regulation, impregnated with Economy and Economic Analysis of Law, has sometimes little basis of legal tradition, it put in question of this summa divisio. If this were to be the case, it would be the totality of the legal systems which would be upset, especially in its judicial organization, since the judicial civil and commercial system is so distinctly distinguished (that of "ordinary" persons, that of "common law ) and the administrative judge (the "natural judge" of the State). It is then realized that the Law of Regulation challenges the whole Law, especially in the Latin countries and the Civil Law systems.

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lagarde, Ch., A regulatory Approch to FinTech, mai 2018. 

 

Lire l'article

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Référence complète Fox, E., The new world order, in Mélanges Joël Monéger, Liber Amicorum en l'honneur du Professeur Joël Monéger, LexisNexis, 2017, 818 p.  

 

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Référence complète : Manacorda, Stefano, La dynamique des programmes de conformité des entreprises : déclin ou transfiguration du droit pénal des affaires ?, in Supiot, Alain (dir.), L'entreprise dans un monde sans frontières. Perspectives économiques et juridiques, coll. "Les sens du droit", Dalloz, 2015, 320 p.

 

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent via le Drive lire l'article dans le dossier "MAFR - Régulation".

 

 

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

Paradoxically, the notion of conflict of interest seems to be at the center of Economic Law only recently in Economic Law, in both Corporate and Public Law. This is due to the philosophy which animates these two branches of Law, very different for each, and which has changed in each.

In fact, and in the first place in Public Law, in the Continental legal systems and especially in French legal tradition, on the side of the State, the one who serves it, by a sort of natural effect,, makes the general interest incarnated by the State pass before its personal interest. There is an opposition of interests, namely the personal interest of this public official who would like to work less and earn more, and the common interest of the population, who would like to pay less taxes and for example benefit trains that always arrive on time and the general interest which would be for example the construction of a European rail network.

But this conflict would be resolved "naturally" because the public official, having "a sense of the general interest" and being animated by the "sense of public service", sacrifices himself to serve the general interes. He stays late at his office and gets the trains on time. This theory of public service was the inheritance of royalty, a system in which the King is at the service of the People, like the aristocracy is in the "service of the King." There could therefore be no conflict of interest, neither in the administration nor in the public enterprises, nor to observe, manage or dissolve. The question does not arise ...

Let us now take the side of the companies, seen by the Company Law. In the classical conception of corporate governance, corporate officers are necessarily shareholders of the company and the profits are mandatorily distributed among all partners: the partnership agreement is a "contract of common interest". Thus, the corporate officer works in the knowledge that the fruits of his efforts will come back to him through the profits he will receive as a partner. Whatever its egoism - and even the agent must be, this mechanism produces the satisfaction of all the other partners who mechanically will also receive the profits. Selfishness is indeed the motor of the system, as in the classical theory of Market and Competition. Thus, in the corporate mechanism, there is never a conflict of interest since the corporate officer is obligatorily associated: he will always work in the interest of the partners since in this he works for himself. As Company Law posits that the loss of the company will also be incurred and suffered by all partners, he will also avoid this prospect. Again, there is no need for any control. The question of a conflict of interest between the mandatary and those who conferred this function does not structurally arise...

These two representations both proved inaccurate. They were based on quite different philosophies - the public official being supposed to have exceeded his own interest, the corporate officer being supposed to serve the common interest or the social interest by concern for his own interest - but this was by  a unique reasoning that these two representations were defeated.

Let us take the first on Public Law: the "sense of the State" is not so common in the administration and the public enterprises, that the people who work there sacrifice themselves for the social group. They are human beings like the others. Researchers in economics and finance, through this elementary reflection of suspicion, have shattered these political and legal representations. In particular, it has been observed that the institutional lifestyle of public enterprises, very close to the government and their leaders, is often not very justified, whereas it is paid by the taxpayer, that is, by the social group which they claimed to serve. Europe, by affirming in the Treaty of Rome the principle of "neutrality of the capital of enterprises", that is to say, indifference to the fact that the enterprise has as its shareholder a private person or a public person, validated this absence of exceeding of his particular interest by the servant of the State, become simple economic agent. This made it possible to reach the conclusion made for Company Law.

Disillusionment was of the same magnitude. It has been observed that the corporate officer, ordinary human being, is not devoted to the company and does not have the only benefit of the profits he will later receive as a partner. He sometimes gets very little, so he can receive very many advantages (financial, pecuniary or in kind, direct or indirect). The other shareholders see their profits decrease accordingly. They are thus in a conflict of interest. Moreover, the corporate officer was elected by the shareholders' meeting, that is to say, in practice, the majority shareholder or the "controlling" shareholder (controlling shareholder) and not by all. He may not even be associated (but a "senior officer").

The very fact that the situation is no longer qualified by lawyers, through the qualifications of classical Company Law, still borrowing from the Civil Contract Law, the qualifications coming more from financial theories, borrowing from the theory of the agency, adically changed the perspective. The assumptions have been reversed: by the same "nature effect", the conflict of interest has been disclosed as structurally existing between the manager and the minority shareholder. Since the minority shareholder does not have the de facto power to dismiss the corporate officer since he does not have the majority of the voting rights, the question does not even arise whether the manager has or has not a corporate status: the minority shareholder has only the power to sell his securities, if the management of the manager is unfavorable (right of exit) or the power to say, protest and make known. This presupposes that he is informed, which will put at the center of a new Company Law information, even transparency.

Thus, this conflict of interests finds a solution in the actual transfer of securities, beyond the legal principle of negotiability. For this reason, if the company is listed, the conflict of interest is translated dialectically into a relationship between the corporate officer and the financial market which, by its liquidity, allows the agent to be sanctioned, and also provides information, Financial market and the minority shareholder becoming identical. The manager could certainly have a "sense of social interest", a sort of equivalent of the state's sense for a civil servant, if he had an ethics, which would feed a self-regulation. Few people believe in the reality of this hypothesis. By pragmatism, it is more readily accepted that the manager will prefer his interest to that of the minority shareholder. Indeed, he can serve his personal interest rather than the interest for which a power has been given to him through the informational rent he has, and the asymmetry of information he enjoys. All the regulation will intervene to reduce this asymmetry of information and to equip the minority shareholder thanks to the regulator who defends the interests of the market against the corporate officers, if necessary through the criminal law. But the belief in managerial volunteerism has recently taken on a new dimension with corporate social responsability, the social responsibility of the company where managers express their concern for others.

The identification of conflicts of interests, their prevention and their management are transforming Financial Regulatory Law and then the Common Law of Regulation, because today it is no longer believed a priori that people exceed their personal interest to serve the interest of others. It is perhaps to regain trust and even sympathy that companies have invested in social responsibility. The latter is elaborated by rules which are at first very flexible but which can also express a concern for the general interest. In this, it can meet Compliance Law and express on behalf of the companies a concern for the general interest, if the companies provide proof of this concern.

To take an example of a conflict of interest that resulted in substantial legal changes, the potentially dangerous situation of credit rating agencies has been pointed out when they are both paid by banks, advising them and designing products, While being the source of the ratings, the main indices from which the investments are made. Banks being the first financial intermediaries, these conflicts of interest are therefore systematically dangerous. That is why in Europe ESMA exercises control over these rating agencies.

The identification of conflicts of interest, which most often involves changing the way we look at a situation - which seemed normal until the point of view changes - the moral and legal perspective being different, Trust one has in this person or another one modifying this look, is today what moves the most in Regulation Law.
This is true of Public and Corporate Law, which are extended by the Regulation Law, here itself transformed by Compliance Law, notably by the launchers of alerts. But this is also true that all political institutions and elected officials.

For a rule emerges: the more central the notion of conflict of interest becomes, the more it must be realized that Trust is no longer given a priori, either to a person, to a function, to a mechanism, to a system. Trust is no longer given only a posteriori in procedures that burden the action, where one must give to see continuously that one has deserved this trust.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The liberal professions such as lawyers, doctors or accountants are organized into professional bodies and consider that they can not be reduced to mere companies operating in markets because the service they offer includes a human and moral dimension, translated by ethics, under the supervision of their internal professional organization, particularly through ex ante their power to adopt their own standards of behavior, and in ex post, the disciplinary power of their professional order.

Competition law refutes this organization from the Old Regime and simply considers the "markets of legal or medical services, firms having to compete with each other and not having to organize the sector, by  or fixing Numerus clausus, etc.

In the perspective of regulation, the liberal professions are, on the contrary, the ones most pertinento organize self-regulation in a globalized economy from the moment they give rise to a credible surveillance system and thus deserve the confidence of customers and public regulators.

Compliance and Regulation Law bilingual Dictionnary

The notion of "Common Goods" refers to a political conception insofar as it concerns objectively commercial goods such as cultural goods or medical services, but which the community is going to demand that everyone should have access to it even though the individual does not have the ability to pay the exact price. It is then the taxpayer - present or future - or the social partners who bear the cost, or even some companies, through the corporal social social responsibility mechanism.

This protection of Common Goods can be done by the State in the name of the interest of the social group for which it is responsible and whose it expresses the will, particularly through the notion of the general interest. In this now restricted framework which is the State, this reference runs counter to the principle of competition. This is particularly clear in Europe, which is based on a Union built on an autonomous and integrated legal order in the Member States in which competition continues to have a principled value and benefits from the hierarchy of norms. The evolution of European Law has balanced the principle of competition with other principles, such as the management of systemic risks, for example health, financial or environmental risks and the creation of the banking union shows that the principle of competition is no longer an apex in the European system.

But it still remains to an economic and financial conception of Europe, definition that the definition of the Regulatory Law  when it is restricted to the management of the market failures feeds. It is conceivable that Europe will one day evolve towards a more humanistic conception of Regulatory  Law, the same one that the European States practice and defend, notably through the notion of public service. Indeed and traditionally, public services give people access to common goods, such as education, health or culture.

Paradoxically, even though Law is not set up on a global scale, it is at this level that the legal notion of "common goods" has developed.

When one refers to goods that are called "global goods", one then seeks goods that are common to humanity, such as oceans or civilizations. It is at once the heart of Nature and the heart of Human Being, which plunges into the past and the future. Paradoxically, the concept of "global goods" is still more political in substance, but because of a lack of global political governance, effective protection is difficult, as their political consecration can only be effective nationally or simply declaratory internationally. That is why this balance is at present only at national level, which refers to the difficulty of regulating globalization.

Thus, the "common goods" legally exist more under their black face: the "global evils" or "global ills" or "global failures", against which a "Global Law" actually takes place. The notion of "global evils" constitutes a sort of mirror of Common Goods. It is then observed that countries that develop legal discourse to regulate global evils and global goods thus deploy global unilateral national Law. This is the case in the United States, notably in financial regulatory Law or more broadly through the new Compliance Law, which is being born. Companies have a role to play, particularly through Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility.

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lafontaine, C., Le corps-marché. La marchandisation de la vie humaine à l'ère de la bioéconomie, Le seuil, 2014.
 

May 15, 2019

Editorial responsibilities : Direction of the "Régulations & Compliance" series, Editions Dalloz

Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A. (dir.), Pour une Europe de la Compliance, série "Régulations & Compliance", Dalloz, 2019, 124 pages. 

 

La dimension politique est intrinsèque au Droit de la Compliance. En effet, les mécanismes de Compliance consistent à internaliser dans certaines entreprises l’obligation de concrétiser des buts d’intérêt général fixés par des Autorités publiques. Celles-ci contrôlent la réorganisation Ex Ante que cela implique pour ces entreprises et sanctionnent Ex Post l’inadéquation éventuelle des entreprises, devenues pour ce faire transparentes. Ce nouveau mode de gouvernance établit un continuum entre Régulation, Supervision, Compliance (2017) et renouvelle les liens entre les Entreprises, Régulateurs et Juges (2018).

Cette dimension politique doit être accrue : le Droit de la Compliance doit aujourd’hui servir à construire l’Europe.

Non seulement on observe la construction d’un Droit européen de la Compliance, à la fois objet par objet, secteur par secteur, but par but, mais encore la construction d’un Droit européen de la Compliance qui les dépassent et les unifie. Devenant en cela autonome du Droit américain et cessant d’être en réaction, voire sur la défensive, le Droit de la Compliance contribue au projet européen, en lui offrant une ambition plus haute, que l’Europe peut porter et qui peut porter l’Europe, non seulement pour préserver l’économie européenne de la corruption ou du blanchiment, mais en revendiquant la protection de la nature et des êtres humains.

C’est pourquoi l’ouvrage décline les « raisons et les objectifs » d’une Europe de la Compliance, ce qui permet d’en décrire, détecter, voire prédire les voies et instruments.

 

Participent à l’ouvrage : Thierry Bonneau, Monique Canto-Sperber, Jean-Jacques Daigre, Charles Duchaine, Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Arnaud de La Cotardière, Koen Lenaerts, Jean-Claude Marin, Didier Martin, Xavier Musca, Pierre Sellal et Pierre Vimont.

Chaque mention d'un auteur renvoie à un résumé de sa contribution. 

 

Lire l'avant-propos de l'ouvrage

 

Consulter la Série dans laquelle l'ouvrage est publié aux Éditions Dalloz.

 

 

April 8, 2019

Conferences

Cette participation à la table-ronde présidée par Andrea Enria, chairman du Supervisory Board du Single Supervisory Mecanism de la Banque Centrale Européenne qui a pour thème Competition and Regulation in the financial sector

Elle-même fait partie d'une journée ayant pour thème Competition in a globalised world: the role of public policies, organisée dans le cadre du G7 France 2019 par la Banque de France et le Ministère de l'économie et des finances.

La conférence et les supports sont en anglais.

Dans la table-ronde, il m'est plus particulièrement demandé d'abord la question de la méthodologie à adopte dans le secteur financier, en raison des nouveaux acteurs digitaux, et des principes à adopter à propos des datas.

 

Lire le programme générale de la journée.

Lire les slides servant de base à l'intervention.

Feb. 13, 2019

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Référence générale : Patrick Wajsman (dir.), Politique internationale, dossier spécial, Investissement responsable : l'essor, n°162, hiver 2018-2019, 119 p.

 

Consulter le sommaire de la Revue.

 

Consulter la présentation des entretiens suivants :

 

Boujnah, S., Places boursières : promouvoir un modèle européen.

Jensen, S., Norvège : exemple d'un fonds souverain éthique.

Ribera, T., Faciliter la transition écologique : ce que peut l'État.

 

Dec. 24, 2018

Illustrated Law

Le Droit n'est fait que de mots. L'essentiel est donc de les ranger (exercice de qualification) pour que se déclenche à propos d'eux un régime juridique, par exemple la liberté, l'autorisation ou l'interdiction.

Prenons un exemple américain, un exemple chéri par cette culture-là : le port d'arme.

Un juge fédéral de New-York a rendu une Ordonnance le 14 décembre 2018 à propos de la qualification juridique d'un nunchaku!footnote-1399  posant que sa détention par une personne à son domicile ne peut être prohibée par un Etat car l'individu exerce en cela son droit constitutionnel du port d'arme, tel que défini par la Cour suprême. En cela, il donne raison au demandeur qui contestait une disposition législative interdisant la détention par un individu de ce type d'arme.

En effet en 1974 l'Etat de New-York a interdit leur fabrication, leur transport, leur stockage, leur possession. 35 ans après, un juge estime que ce texte, tel qu'il est rédigé, est contraire au droit constitutionnel de porter une arme, ce qui anéantit la prohibition.

Pourquoi ?

 

En effet, la distinction expressément soutenue par le demandeur entre la possession à domicile d'une arme inusuelle pour inventer un nouvel art martial n'a pas été retenue en tant que telle, mais bien plutôt une démonstration probatoire qui oblige l'Etat qui prohibe un port d'arme à supporter (puisqu'il porte atteinte à une liberté constitutionnelle)  la charge de prouver que le port de cette arme n'est pas une façon pour un individu ordinaire d'être en mesure de l'utiliser conformément à la loi, par exemple pour se défendre (I). On aurait pourtant pu concevoir une définition plus stricte de ce qu'est une "arme", au moment même où la distinction entre les armes de défense et les armes d'assaults justifie des interdictions nouvelles et que ce dernier type d'argument a convaincu des juges fédéraux (II). Mais n'est-ce pas plutôt parce qu'aujourd'hui on oublie Bruce Lee et que cet américain moyen, qui a la mémoire courte - auquel se réfère le juge - n'est pas Tarantino, qui a la mémoire longue, comme tout cinéphile  ? (III).

 

 

1

Définition donnée par l'interdiction d'en posséder émise en 1974 par l'Etat de New-York : " “‘Chuka stick’ means any device designed primarily as a weapon, consisting of two or more lengths of a rigid material joined together by a thong, rope or chain in such a manner as to allow free movement of a portion of the device while held in the hand and capable of being rotated in such a manner as to inflict serious injury upon a person by striking or choking. These devices are also known as nunchakus and centrifugal force sticks.” N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00(14). The Court shall refer to chuka sticks and nunchakus interchangeably.". 

Dec. 19, 2018

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Référence complète : Lasmoles O., « La difficile appréhension des blockchains par le droit », Revue internationale de droit économique, 2018/4 (t. XXXII), p. 453-469. 

Dec. 17, 2018

Editorial responsibilities : Direction de la collection "Droit et Économie", L.G.D.J. - Lextenso éditions (30)

Référence complète : Laget-Annamayer, A. (dir.), L'ordre public économique, coll. "Droit et Économie", LGDJ - Lextenso éditions, 2018, 397p.

 

Il s'agit du 32ième volume paru dans cette collection.

 

Souvent lancé comme une expression englobante, aussi bien par la doctrine que par le juge, l’ordre public économique reste un concept mystérieux dont on peine à connaître la substance et les contours, tout simplement parce qu’il est susceptible de fluctuer selon son appréhension et selon le contexte économique et social.

Pourtant l’expression est devenue d’un usage courant, presque incantatoire, tel un label, et il existe donc incontestablement un décalage entre son invocation et sa signification en droit. C’est à ce décalage, et pour tenter d’en réduire le mystère, que cet ouvrage est consacré. Ne s’arrêtant pas à la seule vision de l’ordre public économique en droit public interne, il tente d’en chercher les significations en droit comparé, en droit européen et international, sans omettre la vision historique, privatiste ou économique. C’est donc à ce riche tour d’horizon traité par des spécialistes de différents champs juridiques et au-delà que cet ouvrage invite. Il n’a pas pour objectif de mettre un point final au débat, mais au contraire de le susciter dans le cadre des réflexions sur les rapports entre droit et économie dont chacun connait l’importance.

Les auteurs sont :

  • Olivier Baillet,
  • Jacques Caillosse,
  • Aurélien Camus,
  • Jacques Chevallier,
  • Dominique Custos,
  • Pierre Delvolvé,
  • Samuel Ferey,
  • Sébastien Hourson,
  • Pascale Idoux,
  • Jean-Philippe Kovar,
  • Aurore Laget-Annamayer,
  • Jérémy Martinez,
  • Francesco Martucci,
  • Jeanne Mesmin d’Estienne,
  • Claire Mongouachon,
  • Eric Naim-Gesbert,
  • Guillaume Richard,
  • Jean-Marc Sorel,
  • Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières.

 

Lire la quatrième de couverture.

Lire la table des matières.

 

Consulter l'ensemble de la collection dans laquelle l'ouvrage a été publié.

Nov. 13, 2018

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Discours d'Emmanuel Macron, président de la République, au Forum "Gouvernance Internet", Unesco, 13 novembre 2018. 

 

Lire le Discours. Compl

Nov. 7, 2018

Publications

Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Le système juridique français constitue-t-il un atout ou un handicap pour nos entreprises et nos territoires ? in Pébereau, M. (dir.), Réformes et transformations, PUF, 2018.

 

Résumé : La formulation de la question posée est comme une fermeture de tout débat, posant implicitement que le Droit devrait servir l'Économie et le servir "bien" (atout) plutôt que "mal" (handicap), alors qu'il faudrait s'accorder sur une méthode consistant pour chaque discipline à l'œuvre à ne prendre l'ascendant sur l'autre (I). Ce jugement doit être global, porter sur le droit en tant qu'il est un système. Quand on lit les différents travaux, ils ne portent que sur tel ou tel mécanisme, au mieux sur tel ou tel branche du Droit, ce qui méconnaît le fait que le Droit français est un système (II). C'est pourtant bien qu'en tant qu'il est un système que le Droit français doit être saisi, l’appréhender non seulement par ses signaux forts, mais aussi par ses signaux faibles Ceux-ci peuvent constituer les atouts les plus précieux (III).  Plus encore, il est fructueux de donner plein effet à ce terme si particulier et peu souvent valorisé qu’est le terme de « territoire », placé dans la question, terme si ancien et aujourd'hui si intriguant puisque de "nouveaux territoires" s'offrent à nous : le digital, l’Europe. Et là, le système juridique français, que peut-il apporter, portant alors ce que l’on pourrait appeler la gloire française, car le Droit est comme le Politique une discipline qui porte des « prétentions », par exemple celle de construire l’Europe, par exemple l’Europe digitale (IV).

 

Lire l'article.

 

Lire le document de travail ayant servi de base à l'article

 

Updated: Sept. 1, 2018 (Initial publication: May 10, 2018)

Publications

This working paper has served  as a basis for an article written in French in the book Compliance : Entreprise, Régulateur, Juge ("Compliance: Enterprise, Regulator, Judge"), published in May 2018 in the Regulations Series of Dalloz editions (Paris).

See the other books published in this collection (presentation in French), directed by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche (presentation in English).


ABSTRACT: The Company, the Regulator and the Judge are three key figures for the construction of an emerging Law of Compliance. An important risk lies in a confusion of their respective roles, the company becoming a regulator, the regulator becoming a board of a place that goes to the conquest of others, the judge standing back. It is appropriate that each plays his role and that their respective function is not distorted. If this confusion is avoided, then the points of contact can multiply and one observes it. But as soon as everyone remains in their place, we can go further than these points of contact and if they agreed, the three characters can reach common goals. This is all the more legitimate since the Law of Compliance, as the Law of Regulation, is teleological in nature, which makes these branches of law profoundly political. These common goals are technical, such as risk prevention. They can be more political and higher, if there is a shared will, without ever one of the characters being captured by another: it is then to concern by the human being. The designation of this common goal to the Company, the Regulator and the Judge can be expressed in one word: Europe.

July 26, 2018

Base Documentaire : Doctrine

Référence complète : Couret, A., Les figures du procureur privé, in Recueil Dalloz, n°28, 2018, p. 1545

 

Les étudiants de Sciences-Po peuvent consulter l'article via le drive, dossier " MAFR - Régulation & Compliance "

June 7, 2018

Publications

L'on semble bien obnubilé par le "RGPD"...  Que l'on étudie virgule après virgule. Cela se comprend puisqu'il faut bien des modes d'emploi.

Il convient aussi de regarder ce qui a constitué son terrain et son contexte, avant de comprendre de quoi ce Règlement est porteur. 

Pour le comprendre, il faut sans doute regarder certains détails, certains mots (sa "lettre"), son but (son "esprit"). D'ailleurs,classiquement en Droit dans le Code civil il est rappelé que pour connaître l'esprit d'un texte il faut partir de sa lettre, c'est-à-dire de ses mots. Et là, l'on est bien ennuyé pour que nous ne parlons que par sigles : RGPD, RGPD ... Mais ce sigle est-il même exact ? Est-ce là le titre du Règlement de 2016 ? Non. Le juriste, qu'il soit européen ou américain, de Civil Law ou de Common Law, ne lit pas les commentaires : il lit les textes, les lois et les jurisprudences. Il cherche les définitions et les qualifications. Il replace les mots qui se saisissent des réalités dans l'ensemble : par exemple : la "donnée". Il en cherche la définition. Qui définit ce qu'est une "donnée" ?

Puis il prend une perspective. Non pas parce qu'il est un bel esprit, qui aime les perspective. Non, le juriste est plutôt un esprit besogneux, assez plat. La perspective vient de la matière. Mais on sommes en "Droit économique". Et même en "Droit de la régulation". Or, dans ces matières-là, il n'est pas contesté que la "norme", le principe, celui qui donne un sens aux définitions, aux qualifications, aux règles techniques, qui donnent des solutions aux cas non prévus par le texte, est dans le but poursuivi par les dispositions : c'est un Droit de nature "téléologique".

Quel est le but du "RGPD". Il suffit de lire le titre de ce Règlement. Cela est bien difficile, puisqu'un sigle l'a désormais recouvert ... Mais ce règlement du 27 avril 2016 est  relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données

Il a donc deux buts : la protection des personnes ; la circulation des données.

Il faut donc poser que le but du Règlement est la construction de l'Europe numérique, sur le principe de circulation des données, principe libéral classique qui construit un espace par la dynamique de la circulation : c'est la perspective de l'Europe numérique qui anime le Règlement (I). Pour ce faire, quelle est la nouveauté du système ? Elle tient en une seule chose. Car le Parlement français a insisté sur le fait que la nouvelle loi de transposition adoptée le 17 mai 2018 vient modifier la loi informatique et Libertés de 1978 sans la remplacer. La nouveauté tient dans le fait que ce ne sont plus les Autorités publiques, nationales ou de l'Union qui sont en charge de l'effectivité du dispositif, mais les entreprises elles-mêmes : la Régulation digitale (qui demeure publique) a été internalisée dans les entreprises. Il s'agit désormais d'un mécanisme de "Compliance". En cela, le "RGDP" est non seulement le bastion avancé de l'Europe numérique, mais encore le bastion avancé de "l''Europe de la Compliance". Celle-ci a un grand avenir, notamment vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis, et les entreprises y ont un rôle majeur. Le numérique n'en est qu'un exemple, le Droit européen de la Compliance étant en train de se mettre en place. 

May 31, 2018

Conferences

Référence générale : Frison-Roche, M.-A., La garde de l'unité de la personne dans un système a-moral, in Cour de cassation & Association française de philosophie du Droit, Droit & Ethique 31 mai 2018, Paris.

 

 

 

 

Lire le programme disponible sur le site de la Cour de cassation.

Lire une présentation générale du colloque.

 

Lire une présentation des observations finales par ailleurs présentée.. 

 

Résumé de la contribution :  Le Droit a pour fonction de protéger l'être humain. Si l'on confronte la situation concrète des être humains et la puissance du Droit (I), le Droit peut donner une unité à l'être humain, unité qu'il n'a pas ni par nature ni par la société, par l'invention juridique de la personnalité (I.A).  Mais le Droit est aujourd'hui lui-même tenté de pulvériser l'unité de la personne, notamment à travers le "Droit des données" et le "Droit des prestations corporelles", ce dont la GPA est le bastion avancé (I.B). L'on  songe alors à requérir la souveraineté éthique du Droit (II) Pourquoi ? Parce qu'il y a urgence à maintenir l'unité de la personne humaine grâce au Droit, en raison de l'a-moralité d'un monde sans limite, gouverné par la rencontre livre des désirs (II.A) en retenant l'hypothèse d'un droit "de principe" (II.B), d'un Droit qui peut exprimer les principes éthiques garantissant à l'être humain d'être pas la matière première de marchés de l'humain qui se construisent sous nos yeux (II.C).

 

Faute de temps, cette contribution n'a pas pu être présentée.

Lire le document de travail sur la base duquel la conférence a été élaborée.

Ce travail sera utilisé pour l'élaboration d'un article à paraître aux Archives de Philosophie du Droit