Publications [761]

Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Incentives and Compliance, a promising couple to increase the Compliance Law utility, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Bruylant, 2021, p. 141-148

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Summary of the article: The theory of incentives targets the mechanisms which do not use directly constraint (except to present sanctions themselves as incentives) but which leads nevertheless to expected behaviors. To appreciate the links which must or must not be done between incentives and Compliance, we should proceed in two times. 

First, the association appears natural between incentive mechanisms and "Compliance Law" since the later is defined in a dynamic way. Indeed, if it is defined placing its legal normativity in its "monumental goals", as the end of corruption, the detection of money laundering in order to underlying criminality disappears, or as the effective protection of environment or the concrete care of human beings, then what matters is not the means in themselves but the effective tension towards these "monumental goals". In this perspective, what was related to public policies led by States, because they are definitively not able to do it, the charge is internalized in the firms which are able to tend towards this goals: "crucial operators" because they have the geographical, technological, informational and financial means. 

In this perspective, the internalization of public willingness provoking a split with the concept of State linked to a territory which deprives Politics of its constraint power, incentive mechanisms appear as the most efficient mean to reach these monumental goals. They appear as this "natural" mean both negatively and positively defined. Negatively in which they do not need in Ex Ante institutional localizable sources and sanction power in Ex Post: it is enough to substitute the interest to obligation. Positively, incentives relay through operators' strategies what was the so critical and joked form of public action: the "plan". The duration is thus injected thanks to Compliance mechanisms, as we can see it through the development of it in the care for environment ("plan climat") or through the educational mechanism, which could be conceived only in duration.  

However, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. And this because of three convictions often developed and that we have to overcome. First, the idea that in a general way, there would be a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is associated to the norm. As long as the incentive is not based on obligation, then it will be nothing... Secondly, and as if that were a kind of consolation ..., Compliance would not be really Law either ... We so often say that it is only about a methodology, a range of processes without sense, procedures to follow without trying to understand, process that algorithms integrate in a mechanic without end and without sense or that on the contrary, Compliance would be full of sense by Ethics and Morality, which are far from Law. While incentives talk to the human spirit which calculate, Compliance would be so a process through which machines will be connected to other machines, so an extra soul, where calculation has no place... Thirdly, solutions would be to be find in Competition Law because it can do without States, submit them and approach what is a-sectorial, especially finance and digital, the world being financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which comes in Ex Ante thanks to "Compliance sanctions" applying for example to essential infrastructures Law, by continuing to deny the salience of the duration and taking care of the "market power" would be also not compatible with a marriage with incentive mechanisms which rely on duration and power of those to which it is applied, converging towards goals, which are set by what Competition Law ignores: the project. This project which pretends to build the future is the one of politics and of companies, which use their deployed power in time to concretize it. It is without any doubt there that the future of Europe is. 

To overcome this triple difficulty, it is thus necessary, in a second time, to modify our conception of Law, especially thanks to Compliance Law, in which this new branch is autonomous from Competition Law, and even sometimes opposed to it, in order to the insertion of incentive mechanisms permit to unknown or against Competition Law organizations to reach "monumental goals" which are imperative to take into consideration. For example, the taking into consideration of climate challenges or the building of a sovereign identity of the data. This is expressly set by European Commission which supervises such initiatives, supervision being what is articulated with Compliance, in a couple that go beyond Regulation, and replaces in Ex Ante Competition Law, salient branch for Ex Post. All the texts which are in the process of expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive.

This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as project carriers, project which is the creation of marketed wealth circulating on a market, which could be an industrial project specific to a geographical zone both economical and political. Regulation is deployed to go away from the notion of sector and to transform itself in supervision of crucial firms in the correspondance between the project and the action, what refers to the notion of "plan". In this, banking supervision is just the advanced bastion of all thematic, energetic, climatic and health plans, or more broadly industrial and technological that could by incentive be implemented, this conception of Compliance permitting to build zones which are not reduced to immediate market exchange. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the firm to reach its own political goals, for example fighting against disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environnement. This supposes that Compliance stops to be only conceived as a model of rules effectivity, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch which expresses political goals. A branch which is anchored in crucial firms whose it recognizes the autonomy with regards to markets. This makes it possible, in particular through the coupling with incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple Competition Law, inapt to bring projects to fruition.

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Read the bilingual work paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks on which this article is based

Read a general presentation of the book in which the article has been published.

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Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, serie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) & Bruylant, 2021.

This book in English is the first title of this collection integrally dedicated to Compliance Law, in that it is the extension of Regulation Law. 

Read the titles of this series in English co-published by Bruylant. 

This collection in English is articulated with a collection co-published between the Journal of Regulation & Compliance and Dalloz.

Thus, in parallel, a book in French, Les Outils de la Compliance is published. 

Read the titles of the series in French co-published with Dalloz. 

This book is published after a  cycle of colloquiums organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Partners Universities.

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General Presentation of the collective book

The political dimension of Compliance Law lies in the goals it aims to achieve. To achieve them, the concern for these goals is internalized in "crucial operators", which may be obliged to concretize "monumental goals" set by public authorities. These public bodies control the Ex Ante reorganization that this implies for these companies and sanction Ex Post the possible inadequacy of the companies, which have become transparent to this end. The effectiveness and efficiency of this internalization, without which the statement of these goals is worth nothing, is based on the Compliance tools that are deployed.

These appear to be very diverse but their substantial unity (topic which will be the subject of a forthcoming book) makes it possible to study the tools put in place from a unique perspective, by not isolating them in a particular branch of Law, Criminal law or International Law for example, but by measuring what is common to them, notably Anticipation, Trust, Commitment, Responsibility, Incentive, and so on. If the Compliance tools vary, it is rather not only according to the sectors, finance and banking appearing then as the advanced point of the general Compliance Law, for example in environmental matters, but also according to the countries and the cultures. It is in fact about them that legal cultures seem to oppose.

The book aims to understand these "tools" by going beyond the description of each instrument, for which we already have many monographs, for analyzing them through the issues of Risks, required Expertises, Training. Sovereignty claims, Incentives, mechanical aptitude of Technologies. It is through these themes that are analyzed by the authors, experts in the field, what we always want to understand better: Compliance Programs, Whistle blowing, Mapping, Sanctions, Extraterritoriality, etc.

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Read the summary of the book. 

Read the foreword, summarizing all the contributions.  

Présentation of the book contributions:

• Amico, Th., Compliance or the passage from ex post to ex ante: A Copernican revolution for the criminal lawyer?

• Banck, A., The maturity of the Compliance tool’s user, first criterion of the choice of the salient tool

• Burlingame, Coppens R., Power, N, Lee, D.H., Anti-Corruption Compliance: Global Dimension of Enforcement and Risk Management

• Calandri, L., Incentive(s) and Self-Regulation(s): which place for Compliance Law in the Audiovisual Sector? 

• Causse, H., Compliance Training: Through and Beyond Traditional Legal Training

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Describing, designing and correlating Compliance Tools to have a better use of it

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Building by Law the Unicity of Compliance Tools from the Definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals"

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Drawing up Risk Maps as an obligation and the paradox of the "Compliance risks" ​
• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Incentives and Compliance, a couple to propel
• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Resolving the contradiction between sanctions and incentives under the fire of Compliance Law
• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rights, primary and natural Compliance tools

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Training: content and container of Compliance Law​

• Galland, M., The Regulator's Inspection of the Effectiveness of the Compliance Tools Implemented by the Company

• Granier, C., The Normative Originality of Compliance by Design

• Guillaume, N., Compliance risk mapping: first insights of challenges, limits and good practices

• Guttierez-Crespin, A., Audit of Compliance Systems​

• Koenigsberg, S. and Barrière, F., The Development of Attorney's Compliance Expertise

• Larouer, M., The Manifestation of Incentives Mechanisms in French Compliance Law

• Merabet, S., Morality by Design

• Pailler, L., Technological Tools, Compliance by Design and GDPR: the Protection of Personal Data from Design

• Racine, J.-B., Geographical dominance in the choice and the use of Compliance Tools. Introductory remarks

• Rapp, L., Incentive Theory and Governance of Space Activities

• Roda, J.-C., Compliance by design in antitrust: between innovation and illusion

• Salah, M., Conception and Application of Compliance in Africa

• Tardieu, H., Data Sovereignty and Compliance

• Thouret, T., Training and Compliance, Two Correlated Information Transmission Tools

Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Training: content and container of Compliance Law, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, p. 245-264

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Summary of the article

Firstly, as Training is a specific Compliance tool, it is supervised by Regulators. It becomes mandatory when it is contained in Compliance programs or sanction decisions. Since effectiveness and efficiency are legal requirements, what is the margin of companies to design them and how to measure the result?

Secondly, as long as each Compliance tool includes, more and more, an educational dimension, we can take each of them to identify this perspective. So even condemnations and prescriptions are so many lessons, lessons given, lessons to be followed. The question is then to know who, in this so pedagogical Compliance Law, are the "teachers"?

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This article is based on a bilingual Working Paper, including additional technical developments, pop-up notes and hypertext links.

Consult an overview of the volume in which the article was published.

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Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Describing, conceiving and correlating compliance tools, in order to use them adequately, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series Regulation & Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, p. 9-32.

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Summary of the article: The article is the general introduction to the book on Compliance tools. In its first part it develops the overall problematic. In its second part, it presents each of the contributions, placed in the overall construction of the work.

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Read a general presentation of the book in which this article has been published.

Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A..,Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, p. 319-342

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Article Summary: In the traditional conception of the architecture of the sectors regulated by Law, and in Compliance Law which extends the regulatory techniques, rights have little place. But this configuration no longer takes place; on the contrary, rights are at the center of Regulatory and Compliance systems, and will be more and more so. They are and will be the primary tools of Compliance Law because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve. Because every effort must be done to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people and organizations who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goal". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools for actually achieving the goals set, so much so that they can be seen as "primary tools".

But it is pertinent to have more pretension and to conceive rights as the most "natural" tools of Compliance Law. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be expressed by the protection of persons, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given as tools by Law by to persons and rights which constitute the very goal of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights becoming a "natural tool" of Compliance Law.

We are only at the beginning of their deployment and it is undoubtedly on them that Digital space in which we now live would be regulated, so that we will not suffocated there and that it will constitute for people a civilized space.

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Read the bilingual working paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks, on which this article is based 

Read the General Presentation of the book in which this article has been published

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General reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Drawing up Risk Maps as an Obligation and the paradoxe of the "Compliance Risks", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, serie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, p. 61-72

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Summary of the article :

There are few synthetic or theoretical studies on Risk Mapping even though it is in fact the Compliance central tool, perhaps because it is more a management tool than a legal one. Risk Mapping is often described but does not receive any other legal qualifications than being a "modality", suffering in this respect from an evil which affects the whole of Compliance, still little understood by Law, attention often so focused on the Ex Post (sanctions) while Compliance is by nature in the Ex Ante. Going from disarray to incomprehension, everyone can note the existence of "compliance risks" among the mapped risks, because if as so many affirm that it would be necessary to speak only of simple conformity as obedience, demonstrated in Ex Ante, to Law, how a sub-set of a tool would therefore have the same object as the set of Law that this tool serves ... This aporia can only be resolved if Compliance Law is defined substantially by its "monumental goals" which exceed obedience to regulations.

Consequently, Law taking up Risk Mapping, this mechanism may first appear as an ancillary obligation to the main obligation consisting in achieving "monumental goals". The ancillary obligation to draw up the maps is an obligation of result, while the main obligation to achieve the monumental goals is an obligation of means. These cartographies being very diverse and being only occasionally targeted by specific laws, it can also constitute only a legal fact or, through the play of various charters, a unilateral legal commitment. But it isnbecoming the basis of an autonomous legal obligation incumbent on enterprises in position to know certain risks, obligation referring to the existence of a subjective right tof knowing and measuring them ("right to be worried") which the third parties who are going to run them would hold, thus allowing them to choose to run them, or not.

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Read the bilingual working paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks, on which this article is based 

Read a general presentation of the book in which the article is published

____

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Resolving the contradiction between "sanction" and "incentive" under the fire of Compliance Law, in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, series "Regulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, p. 101-112

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Summary of the article: Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. Firstly, because sanctions have a central place in Compliance Law and that the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Thus, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one, or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the other. Resign oneself to the waste that such a necessary choice would imply. But to put the terms in this way amounts to thinking poorly about the situations and reducing the fields of the solutions they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, we can on the contrary articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between the Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators".

This working document deals with the first issue. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms which do not directly resort to constraint. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But it seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the Convention Judiciaire d'Intérêt Public (non-prosecution agreement).

The honest observer cannot help but be immediately uneasy. Indeed, it can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of a Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive?

It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendency to think of the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law, manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons for conceiving it this way, the principles of the rule of law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). This is an essential game (II).

This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. In order for Law to remain, however, we must hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.

____

Read the bilingual working paper, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks, on which this article is based.

Read a general presentation of the book in which this article is published.

____

► Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Building by Law the Unicity of Compliance Tools from the Definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals", in Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Compliance Tools, serie "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant, 2021, pp. 35-46

Summary of the article : The "tools of Compliance" do not stack on top of each other. They form a system, thanks to a unity drawn from the goals that all these multiple and different tools serve: the "Monumental Goals" by which Compliance Law is defined.

All these tools are configured by these goals and for mastering all these techniques, it is essential to put them all in perspective of what Compliance Law is, which is designed teleologically with regard to its goals. Extension of Regulatory Law and like it, Compliance Law is built on a balance between the principle of competition and other concerns that public authorities claim to take care of. Compliance Law has moreover more "pretensions" in this respect, for example in environmental matters. All the means are then good, the violence of the tools marrying without difficulty with the voluntary commitments since it is the goals which govern this branch of Law.

As legal solutions adopted show, a common method of interpretation and common levels of constraint for all Compliance Tools result from this definition. Starting from the goals (in which legal normativity is housed), the interpretation of the different tools is thus unified. Moreover, the different degrees of constraint do not operate according to the consideration of sources (traditional legal criterion) but by the goals, according to the legal distinction between obligations of means and obligations of results which result from the articulation between tools, of which the establishment is an obligation of result, and the goal, of which the achievement is only an obligation of means.

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📝 Read the bilingual working paper on which rely this article.

📝 Read a general presentation of the book in which this article has been published.

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Full Reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A. Place and Role of Companies in the Creation and Effectiveness of Compliance Law in Crisis, Working Paper, May 2021. 

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This Working Paper has been elaborated as basis for a conference in the colloquium of Mai 17, 2021 (done in French: Normes publiques et Compliance en temps de crise : les buts monumentaux à l'épreuve.

This video is made with English substitutes. 

It is also the basis for an article in the book Compliance Monumental Goals, the English version of which is co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant.

Summary: This article has a very topic: the place of private Companies, with regard to the chapter's issue: "the ordeal of a crisis". The crisis constitutes a "test", that is to say, it brings evidence. Let us take it as such.

Indeed, during the health crisis, it appears that Companies have helped the Public Authorities to resist the shock, to endure and to get out of the Crisis. They did so by force, but they also took initiatives in this direction. From this too, we must learn lessons for the next crisis that will come. It is possible that this has already started in the form of another global and systemic crisis: the environmental crisis. In view of what we have been able to observe and the evolution of the Law, of the standards adopted by the Authorities but also by the new case law, what can we expect from Companies in the face of this next Crisis, willingly and strength 

Lire ci-dessous les développements.

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Décrire, concevoir et corréler les outils de la Compliance, pour en faire un usage adéquat" ("Describing, conceiving and correlating Compliance Tools, in order to use them adequately"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. Régulations & Compliance, Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 3-24.

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📝read the article (in French)

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): The article is the general introduction to the book on Compliance tools. In its first part it develops the overall problematic. In its second part, it presents each of the contributions, placed in the overall construction of the work.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Résoudre la contradiction entre "sanction" et "incitation" sous le feu du Droit de la Compliance" ("Resolving the contradiction between "sanction" and "incentive" under the fire of Compliance Law"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 89-98

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📝read the article (in French)

____

🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hyperlinks 

____

📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

____

► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. Firstly, because sanctions have a central place in Compliance Law and that the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Thus, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one, or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the other. Resign oneself to the waste that such a necessary choice would imply. But to put the terms in this way amounts to thinking poorly about the situations and reducing the fields of the solutions they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, we can on the contrary articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between the Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators".

This article deals with the first issue. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms which do not directly resort to constraint. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But it seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the Convention Judiciaire d'Intérêt Public (non-prosecution agreement).

The honest observer cannot help but be immediately uneasy. Indeed, it can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of a Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive?

It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendency to think of the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law, manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons for conceiving it this way, the principles of the rule of law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). This is an essential game (II).

This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. In order for Law to remain, however, we must hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.

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Full reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Questionnaire de Proust (Proust's Quiz), in Droit & Littérature, n°5, p.37-38, Lextenso, 2021.

The chosen topic for this volume is Proust. 

Read (in French)

See its presentation on LinkedIn (in French)

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Les droits subjectifs, outils premiers et naturels du Droit de la Compliance" ("Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 301-323.

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📝read the article (in French)

____

🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks

____

📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

____

► Summary of this article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): In the traditional conception of the architecture of the sectors regulated by Law, and in Compliance Law which extends the regulatory techniques, rights have little place. But this configuration no longer takes place; on the contrary, rights are at the center of Regulatory and Compliance systems, and will be more and more so. They are and will be the primary tools of Compliance Law because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve. Because every effort must be done to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people and organizations who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goal". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools for actually achieving the goals set, so much so that they can be seen as "primary tools".

But it is pertinent to have more pretension and to conceive rights as the most "natural" tools of Compliance Law. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be expressed by the protection of persons, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given as tools by Law by to persons and rights which constitute the very goal of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights becoming a "natural tool" of Compliance Law.

We are only at the beginning of their deployment and it is undoubtedly on them that Digital space in which we now live would be regulated, so that we will not suffocated there and that it will constitute for people a civilized space.

________

► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Compliance et incitations: un couple à propulser " ("Compliance and incentives : a promising tandem"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 123-130.

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📝read the article (in French)

____

🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hypertext links

____

📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

____

► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): The theory of incentives targets the mechanisms which do not use directly constraint (except to present sanctions themselves as incentives) but which leads nevertheless to expected behaviors. To appreciate the links which must or must not be done between incentives and Compliance, we should proceed in two times. 

First, the association appears natural between incentive mechanisms and "Compliance Law" since the later is defined in a dynamic way. Indeed, if it is defined placing its legal normativity in its "monumental goals", as the end of corruption, the detection of money laundering in order to underlying criminality disappears, or as the effective protection of environment or the concrete care of human beings, then what matters is not the means in themselves but the effective tension towards these "monumental goals". In this perspective, what was related to public policies led by States, because they are definitively not able to do it, the charge is internalized in the firms which are able to tend towards this goals: "crucial operators" because they have the geographical, technological, informational and financial means. 

In this perspective, the internalization of public willingness provoking a split with the concept of State linked to a territory which deprives Politics of its constraint power, incentive mechanisms appear as the most efficient mean to reach these monumental goals. They appear as this "natural" mean both negatively and positively defined. Negatively in which they do not need in Ex Ante institutional localizable sources and sanction power in Ex Post: it is enough to substitute the interest to obligation. Positively, incentives relay through operators' strategies what was the so critical and joked form of public action: the "plan". The duration is thus injected thanks to Compliance mechanisms, as we can see it through the development of it in the care for environment ("plan climat") or through the educational mechanism, which could be conceived only in duration.  

However, the opposition seems radical between Compliance Law and Incentives. And this because of three convictions often developed and that we have to overcome. First, the idea that in a general way, there would be a Law only if there is a mechanism of immediate constraint which is associated to the norm. As long as the incentive is not based on obligation, then it will be nothing... Secondly, and as if that were a kind of consolation ..., Compliance would not be really Law either ... We so often say that it is only about a methodology, a range of processes without sense, procedures to follow without trying to understand, process that algorithms integrate in a mechanic without end and without sense or that on the contrary, Compliance would be full of sense by Ethics and Morality, which are far from Law. While incentives talk to the human spirit which calculate, Compliance would be so a process through which machines will be connected to other machines, so an extra soul, where calculation has no place... Thirdly, solutions would be to be find in Competition Law because it can do without States, submit them and approach what is a-sectorial, especially finance and digital, the world being financialized and digitalized. The violence of Competition Law which comes in Ex Ante thanks to "Compliance sanctions" applying for example to essential infrastructures Law, by continuing to deny the salience of the duration and taking care of the "market power" would be also not compatible with a marriage with incentive mechanisms which rely on duration and power of those to which it is applied, converging towards goals, which are set by what Competition Law ignores: the project. This project which pretends to build the future is the one of politics and of companies, which use their deployed power in time to concretize it. It is without any doubt there that the future of Europe is. 

To overcome this triple difficulty, it is thus necessary, in a second time, to modify our conception of Law, especially thanks to Compliance Law, in which this new branch is autonomous from Competition Law, and even sometimes opposed to it, in order to the insertion of incentive mechanisms permit to unknown or against Competition Law organizations to reach "monumental goals" which are imperative to take into consideration. For example, the taking into consideration of climate challenges or the building of a sovereign identity of the data. This is expressly set by European Commission which supervises such initiatives, supervision being what is articulated with Compliance, in a couple that go beyond Regulation, and replaces in Ex Ante Competition Law, salient branch for Ex Post. All the texts which are in the process of expressing it are based on this reformed couple: Compliance and Incentive.

This couple supposes that we recognize as such the existence of companies as project carriers, project which is the creation of marketed wealth circulating on a market, which could be an industrial project specific to a geographical zone both economical and political. Regulation is deployed to go away from the notion of sector and to transform itself in supervision of crucial firms in the correspondance between the project and the action, what refers to the notion of "plan". In this, banking supervision is just the advanced bastion of all thematic, energetic, climatic and health plans, or more broadly industrial and technological that could by incentive be implemented, this conception of Compliance permitting to build zones which are not reduced to immediate market exchange. The incentive corresponds to the fact that Compliance Law relies on the power of the firm to reach its own political goals, for example fighting against disinformation in the digital space or obtaining a healthy environnement. This supposes that Compliance stops to be only conceived as a model of rules effectivity, for example of Competition Law, to be recognized as a substantial branch of Law. A branch which expresses political goals. A branch which is anchored in crucial firms whose it recognizes the autonomy with regards to markets. This makes it possible, in particular through the coupling with incentive mechanisms leading to long-term collaborative operations supervised by public authorities, not to be governed by simple Competition Law, inapt to bring projects to fruition.

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General reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A. (ed.), Les outils  de la Compliance, series "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) & Dalloz, 2021.

In parallel, the book is published in an English version Compliance Tools, co-edited by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant. 

This book follows a cycle of conferences organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance and by its partner universities. 

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See the collection Regulation & Compliance in which the book has been published. 

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General presentation of the book : The political dimension of Compliance Law resides in the monumental goals that it aims for and which define it. These goals are internalized in "crucial operators", who willingly or by force must structure themselves and act to achieve "monumental goals", as set by public authorities and which may coincide with the interests of the enterprise. This one designs and controls the Ex Ante reorganization that this implies, under the public authorities supervision. Enterprises, even if their activities are not regulated, thus become transparent and must show the Compliance Tools effectively deployed to effectively achieve these goals. It is a major transformation of economic life in all countries because the Compliance Tools are adopted everywhere and have a global effect.

These appear to be very diverse but their unity is profound and bringing it out has the practical benefit of producing a legal regime that is as unified as possible, while allowing their adaptation country by country, sector by sector, enterprise by enterprise. 

This book aims to understand these Compliance Tools to better anticipate the assessment that will be made by Regulators, Supervisors and Courts, as well as the new conceptions of the authors of legal texts which impose new ones every day, while companies must also imagine the most appropriate Compliance Tools.

This collective work specifically apprehends those on which we have few studies when we handle them on a daily basis, such as risk mapping or training or rights, letting more familiar tools shine through more transversal contributions, such as compliance programs, sanctions, whistleblowing or many sorts of settlements, agreements of public interest.

A first chapter takes a legal and economic approach. A second chapter emphasizes the role of risk mapping. A third chapter draws the game of incentives. A fourth chapter identifies the expertise required. A fifth chapter insists on geographic significance. A sixth chapter details the measurement of effectiveness. A seventh chapter explores training. The eighth chapter examines technological tools. The concluding article leads to rights.

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Read the general presentation of the book, including the table of contents and the introduction (in French).

Read the presentations of the articles of the book :

• Amico, Th., La Compliance ou le passage de l'ex post à l'ex ante: une révision copernicienne pour l'avocat pénaliste ?

• Banck, A., La maturité de l’usager de l’outil de la Compliance, premier critère du choix de l’outil adéquat

• Benzoni, L., and Deffains, B., Approche économique des outils de la Compliance: finalités, effectivité et mesure de la Compliance "subie" et "choisie"

• Burlingame, R., Coppens, KK, Power, N. & Lee, D.H., Compliance : lutte internationale contre la corruption et gestion du risque

• Calandri, L., Incitation(s) et autorégulation(s): quelle place pour le Droit de la Compliance dans le secteur audiovisuel?

• Causse, H., La formation en Compliance, par et au-delà de la formation classique

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Décrire, concevoir et corréler les outils de la Compliance, pour en faire un usage adéquat

• Frison-Roche, Construire juridiquement l'unité des outils de la Compliance à partir de la définition du droit de la Compliance par ses "buts monumentaux"

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• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et incitations, un couple à propulser

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Résoudre la contradiction entre incitations et sanctions sous le feu du Droit de la Compliance

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Dresser des cartographie des risques comme obligation et le paradoxe des "risques de conformité"

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance : contenu et contenant du Droit de la Compliance 

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Les droits subjectifs, outils premiers et naturels du Droit de la Compliance

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• Galland, M., Le contrôle par le Régulation de l'effectivité des instruments de compliance

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• ​Granier, C., L'originalité normative de la Compliance by design

• Guillaume, N., Cartographie des risques de compliance : premiers aperçus des enjeux,des limites et des bonnes pratiques

• Gutierriez-Crespin, A., L’audit du dispositif de compliance : un outil clé pour en vérifier la robustesse

• Koenigsberg, S. et Barrière, Fr, La construction de l'expertise de l'avocat en matière de compliance

• Larouer, M., Les manifestations des mécanismes incitatifs dans le Droit français de la Compliance

• Merabet, S., La morale by design

• Pailler, L., Les outils technologiques, la Compliance by Design et le RGPD: la protection des données personnelles dès la conception

• Racine, J.-B., La prégnance géographique dans le choix et l'usage des outils de la Compliance

• Rapp, L., Théorie des incitations et gouvernance des activités spatiales

• ​Roda, J.-C., Compliance by Design en antitrust: entre innovation et illusion

• Salah, M., Conception et application de la Compliance en Afrique

• Tardieu, H., Souveraineté des données et Compliance

• Thouret, T., Formation et Compliance, deux outils corrélés de transmission d'information

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Approche juridique des outils de la Compliance. Construire juridiquement  l'unité des outils de la Compliance à partir de la définition du Droit de la Compliance par ses "buts monumentaux"" ("Legal approach to Compliance Tools. Building by Law the Unicity of Compliance Tools from the definition of Compliance Law by its "Monumental Goals""), in  M.-A. Frison-Roche, (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 27-38.

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📝read the article (in French) 

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with more developments, technical references and hypertext links

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): The "tools of Compliance" do not stack on top of each other. They form a system, thanks to a unity drawn from the goals that all these multiple and different tools serve: the "Monumental Goals" by which Compliance Law is defined.

All these tools are configured by these goals and for mastering all these techniques, it is essential to put them all in perspective of what Compliance Law is, which is designed teleologically with regard to its goals. Extension of Regulatory Law and like it, Compliance Law is built on a balance between the principle of competition and other concerns that public authorities claim to take care of. Compliance Law has moreover more "pretensions" in this respect, for example in environmental matters. All the means are then good, the violence of the tools marrying without difficulty with the voluntary commitments since it is the goals which govern this branch of Law.

As legal solutions adopted show, a common method of interpretation and common levels of constraint for all Compliance Tools result from this definition. Starting from the goals (in which legal normativity is housed), the interpretation of the different tools is thus unified. Moreover, the different degrees of constraint do not operate according to the consideration of sources (traditional legal criterion) but by the goals, according to the legal distinction between obligations of means and obligations of results which result from the articulation between tools, of which the establishment is an obligation of result, and the goal, of which the achievement is only an obligation of means.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "Dresser des cartographies des risques comme obligation et le paradoxe des "risques de conformité"" ("Drawing up risk maps as an obligation and the paradoxe of the "compliance risks""), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, p. 53-62.

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📝read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks

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📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance): There are few synthetic or theoretical studies on Risk Mapping even though it is in fact the Compliance central tool, perhaps because it is more a management tool than a legal one. Risk Mapping is often described but does not receive any other legal qualifications than being a "modality", suffering in this respect from an evil which affects the whole of Compliance, still little understood by Law, attention often so focused on the Ex Post (sanctions) while Compliance is by nature in the Ex Ante. Going from disarray to incomprehension, everyone can note the existence of "compliance risks" among the mapped risks, because if as so many affirm that it would be necessary to speak only of simple conformity as obedience, demonstrated in Ex Ante, to Law, how a sub-set of a tool would therefore have the same object as the set of Law that this tool serves ... This aporia can only be resolved if Compliance Law is defined substantially by its "monumental goals" which exceed obedience to regulations.

Consequently, Law taking up Risk Mapping, this mechanism may first appear as an ancillary obligation to the main obligation consisting in achieving "monumental goals". The ancillary obligation to draw up the maps is an obligation of result, while the main obligation to achieve the monumental goals is an obligation of means. These cartographies being very diverse and being only occasionally targeted by specific laws, it can also constitute only a legal fact or, through the play of various charters, a unilateral legal commitment. But it isnbecoming the basis of an autonomous legal obligation incumbent on enterprises in position to know certain risks, obligation referring to the existence of a subjective right tof knowing and measuring them ("right to be worried") which the third parties who are going to run them would hold, thus allowing them to choose to run them, or not.

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► Full Reference: M.-A. Frison-Roche, "La formation : contenu et contenant de la Compliance" ("Training: content and container of Compliance"), in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), Les outils de la Compliance, coll. "Régulations & Compliance", Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Dalloz, 2021, pp.. 227-244.

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📝read the article (in French)

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🚧read the bilingual Working Paper which is the basis of this article, with additional developments, technical references and hyperlinks

____

📕read a general presentation of the book, Les outils de la Compliance, in which this article is published

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► Summary of the article (done by the Journal of Regulation and Compliance): Firstly, as Training is a specific Compliance tool, it is supervised by Regulators. It becomes mandatory when it is contained in Compliance programs or sanction decisions. Since effectiveness and efficiency are legal requirements, what is the margin of companies to design them and how to measure the result?

Secondly, as long as each Compliance tool includes, more and more, an educational dimension, we can take each of them to identify this perspective. So even condemnations and prescriptions are so many lessons, lessons given, lessons to be followed. The question is then to know who, in this so pedagogical Compliance Law, are the "teachers"?

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♾️ s'abonner à la Newsletter MAFR Regulation, Compliance, Law 

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► Référence complète : M.-A. Frison-Roche, 4 cas pratiques pour éprouver le couple Sécurité juridique /Insécurité juridique face à une crise économique, document de travail, mars 2021.

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🖥️ Ce document de travail a été élaboré pour servir de base à une conférence se tenant le 22 mars à la Cour de cassation sur le thème de l'Insécurité juridique en cas de situation exceptionnelle, notamment en cas de crie économique : voir la présentation de la conférence et sa vidéo. 

Il a été fait plutôt que de renoncer à faire cette conférence. Ce qui aurait été le résultat d'un "effet domino".

Quasiment le sujet même de cette conférence.

En effet, il a été élaboré sur page blanche en remplacement d'un premier document de travail, élaboré en février 2021, et non encore fini lorsque l'incendie qui s'est déclenché dans la nuit du 9 au 10 mars 2021 dans les entrepôts d'OVH a fait disparaître de très nombreux sites. Soit temporairement, soit définitivement. Suivant que les sites et leur sauvegarde avaient été situés dans tel ou tel bâtiment.

La perspective d'une possible sauvegarde de la sauvegarde de ce présent fût évoquée et la possible restauration du site envisagée par OVH pour le 22 mars, le jour même du colloque.

La sauvegarde des sauvegardes n'étant pas acquise, le document de travail initial n'étant pas achevé, j'ai choisi de reprendre le sujet sous un autre angle. 

Car s'il est vrai que pouvoir accéder à sa documentation et sa bibliothèque, lesquelles sont sur mon site, est une bonne assise pour produire quelque chose, réfléchir sans cela est une méthode, ici contrainte, qui est également recevable. 

Il suffit de regarder autour de soi.

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📝 lire l'article alimenté par ce document de travail : "Instaurer l'insécurité juridique comme principe, outil de prévention des crises systémiques catastrophiques totales", 2023. 

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🔓Lire les développements ci-dessous ⤵️

Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., La "crise économique", la concevoir et intégrer ouvertement de l'insécurité juridique. Comment la concevoir ? Quel régime juridique concevoir pour une insécurité juridique admise, voire requise ? 

Ce document de travail a été élaboré pour servir de base à une intervention : L'avenir de la notion d'insécurité juridique au regard du traitement des situations extraordinaires : crise économique, dans le colloque "Insécurité juridique : émergence d'une notion ?, Cour de cassation, 22 mars 2021, Paris. 

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"whatever it takes"!footnote-2054.  Mario Draghi, par cette formule visait en 2015 l'objectif de défense de la monnaie européenne, lorsque l'Euro risquait de s'effondrer sous la danse des spéculateurs enrichis de son effondrement. On a  rarement fait formule plus violemment politique et plus fortement normative. Elle a participé à le faire surnommer comme dans le jeu vidéo "Super Mario". La formule a été reprise en 2020 par le Président de la République Française face aux désordres financiers engendrés par la crise sanitaire ayant engendré de semblables calculs!footnote-2055. Elle excède le seul "coût financier"!footnote-2057. Par cette formule, le président de la Banque Centrale Européenne, a posé que la situation de crise économique était telle en Europe que tout pour y mettre fin y serait déployé par l'Institution, sans aucune limite ; que tous ceux qui par leurs comportements, même appuyés sur leurs prérogatives juridiques, en l'espèce les spéculateurs, parce qu'ils détruisaient le système économique et financier, allaient buter sur cela et seraient eux-mêmes balayés par la Banque Centrale car la mission de celle-ci, en ce qu'elle est d'une façon absolue la sauvegarde de l'Euro lui-même, allait prévaloir "quoi qu'il en coûte".

A un moment, le maître se lève. Si la position royale est la position assise lorsque, pondéré, il écoute et juge, c'est en se levant qu'il montre son acceptation d'être aussi le maître parce qu'il est en charge de plus et qu'il fera usage de tout pour gagner. 

A situation financière exceptionnelle, tous les moyens de politique monétaire sont donc bons. C'est ce qui fût dit. Sans aucune limite. Et ce ne n'est pas un principe comme celui de la sécurité juridique, ayant permis à des personnes de jouer de leurs droits, par exemple celui de spéculer, d'engranger par avance des prérogatives sur la situation de demain, qui aurait pu empêcher cette puissance de jure permettant de sauver l'Europe. Car à prendre littéralement la formule, même si c'est au prix des droits acquis et des règles précédemment posées qu'il aurait valu payer, s'il avait valu faire page blanche pour en écrire de toutes nouvelles pour sauver l'Europe, la plume de Draghi les aurait tracées sans s'arrêter à cela. Ainsi, par une telle formule c'est par la Grande Porte, celle de la crise économique et financière, que l'insécurité juridique est entrée dans le Droit. 

Dans le cas de la crise de 2008, la parole suffît puisque la perspective d'une intervention sans limite du pouvoir monétaire sans limite de la Banque centrale fit  que les agissements spéculatifs dévastateurs ne déferlèrent pas. Avoir levé la règle de Droit en ce qu'elle suppose la limite en affirmant qu'il y aurait prévalence absolue du but, suffît donc en Ex Ante pour que la crise ultime ne s'ouvre pas. Cet épisode, digne d'Homère, suffit à éclairer l'insécurité juridique par une de ses dimensions lorsqu'elle est non seulement admissible mais requise : elle peut constituer un acte héroïque. 

Dans une telle perspective, plutôt que de laisser l'insécurité juridique dans l'ombre ce qui ne serait qu'une sorte d'imperfection (parce que l'insécurité juridique ne serait donc que l'imperfection de la sécurité juridique), par l'idée par le "légalisme" devrait avoir des limites, que "le Droit n'est pas tout" et qu'il faudrait savoir "fermer les yeux"..., il faudrait plutôt assumer de dire que certaines circonstances il faut dire haut et fort, c'est-à-dire le dire de jure , l'insécurité juridique est légitime, licite, conforme à la hiérarchie des normes juridiques. 

En cela, dessiner le concept positif de l'insécurité juridique (ce qui ne peut que plaire aux hégéliens), accroît la sécurité juridique : ainsi cela permet d'associer aux hypothèses d'insécurité juridique un régime juridique plus clair. En effet, plutôt que de mettre sous le tapis le Droit, ce qui explique bien des tensions entre le Conseil constitutionnel et le Conseil d'Etat d'une part et le Législateur et le Gouvernement d'autre part concernant "l'Etat d'urgence", l'on pourrait disposer des conditions dans lesquelles l'insécurité juridique permet d'écarter ou de limiter des règles.

Il est posé comme hypothèse qu'à l'avenir une certaine doser d'insécurité juridique pourrait être ouvertement admise : cela serait donc juridiquement conçu, le Droit gagnant toujours avancer à visage découvert. Même si l'on apprécie la "flexibilité" du Droit, il est toujours dangereux en Droit d'affirmer appliquer des règles tout en ne les appliquant pas. 

L'idée proposée est donc que dans des "situations extraordinaires", l'insécurité juridique serait une dimension, voire un principe admissible. Et développant ce premier point il est proposé que l'hypothèse d'une "crise économique" justifie une dimension, voire un principe d' "insécurité juridique".

Mais cette première affirmation est à éprouver. En effet, une crise économique, notion qu'il convient de définir, si elle doit avoir un effet si majeur de retournement, est-elle une "situation" si extraordinaire que cela ?

En outre, pour traiter cette situation extraordinaire que constitue une "crise économique", quelle  dose d'insécurité juridique serait juridiquement admissible, voire pourrait être juridiquement revendiquée ? Voire pourrait-on concevoir un renversement de principe qui conduirait le Droit applicable à une crise économique sous l'égide de l'insécurité juridique ?

Dans un tel cas, la question qui se pose alors est de déterminer les conditions et les critères de la sortie de la crise économique, voire de déterminer les éléments de perspective d'une crise économique, qui pourrait justifier par avance l'admission d'injection d'insécurité juridique. Le Droit a avant tout maîtriser sur le temps futur. 

► Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., L'invention de la vigilance : un terme nouveau pour une Responsabilité en Ex Ante, Document de travail, février 2021. 

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Ce document de travail sert de base à une conférence donnée à Oslo le 9 février 2021.

Pour aller plus loin, ➡️La Responsabilité Ex Ante, 2022

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Lire ci-dessous le document de travail⤵️

Référence complète : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Environnemental Compliance Law, as an Ex Ante Responsability, for an annexe in a French Report on the liability for the environmental Damages, for the European Commission, janvier 2021. 

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This Working Paper has been the basis for the first conference of the two conferences in the colloquium in Toulouse (France) under the scientific direction of Lucien Rapp, about Les incitations, outils de la Compliance ("Incitations, as Compliance Tools"), on December 12, 2019, the first one about The sanction as incitation and the second one about Incitations and Compliance Law (synthesis of this colloquium). 

Then, it has been the basis for the article, to be published in the books Les outils de la Compliance and Compliance Tools in the Series Régulations & Compliance.

Read a general presentation of this book.  

Summary and Introduction of this Working Paper: At first glance, Compliance and Incentives appear to be totally opposite. For two major reasons. In the first place, because the sanctions have a central place in the Law of Compliance and the incentives suppose an absence of constraint on the operators. Secondly, because the incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law assumes a strong presence of public authorities. Taking the first reason, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the others. Resign oneself to the loss that such a necessary choice would involve. But to put the terms thus amounts to think poorly about the situations and reduce the fields of the solutions which they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, it is possible on the contrary to articulate Compliance and Incentives. From this perspective, sanctions can no longer become what blocks the use of incentives but, on the contrary, what constitutes them. Even more, the coupling between Incentives and the requirements of Compliance Law must be strongly encouraged, as soon as the public authorities supervise in Ex Ante all the initiatives taken by the "crucial operators". 

This working document deals with the first issue!footnote-2045. Indeed, the so-called incentive theory targets mechanisms that do not directly use coercion. They would therefore have little place in Compliance Law. But Compliance seems saturated with sanction procedures. We can even say that it seems to put them at the center, the public authorities presenting the number of sanctions as a sign of success, while the companies seem obsessed with their prospects, the two concerns ending in such a strange convergence that are the D.P.O...

An honest observer can only feel immediately uneasy. Indeed, he can only raise the definition of the sanction as a "constraint" triggered Ex Post, at the very heart of Compliance Law which is presented as a set of Ex Ante mechanisms. Based on this contradiction in terms, should we give up the association and think that it would be wrong against the spirit to think of the sanction as an incentive?

It is undoubtedly in this connection that one perceives most clearly the clash of two cultures, which do not communicate, while technically they apply to the same situations. Indeed, because Compliance was firstly designed by Finance, everything is a tool for it. Therefore, the tendancy to think about the sanction only as an incentive is very strong in Compliance Law. It manifests itself continuously and will not stop (I). But whatever the reasons are to conceive it this way, the principles of the Rule of Law cannot disappear and if we do not want them to be erased, then they must be articulated (II). It’s an essential adjustment.

This is why we can literally say that Compliance has set Criminal Law on fire by its conception, logical but closed in on itself, of sanctions as simple incentives. For Law to remain, however, it is necessary to hold a very firm definition of Compliance Law centered on its Monumental Goal, which is the protection of the person.

This working document serves as the basis for two conference given in the symposium made under the direction of Lucien Rapp, Les incitations, outils de la Compliance ("Incitations: Compliance Tools").

Référence : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Compliance et Incitations : un couple à propulser, in Faculté de droit de l'Université Toulouse-Capitole, et Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC),Les incitations, outils de la Compliance, 12 décembre 2019, Toulouse. 

This Working Paper has been the basis for two conferences in the colloquium in Toulouse (France) under the scientific direction of Lucien Rapp, about Les incitations, outils de la Compliance ("Incitations, as Compliance Tools"), on December 12, 2019, the first one about The sanction as incitation and the second one about Incitations and Compliance Law (synthesis of this colloquium). sur le thème de la sanction comme incitation, la seconde en synthèse de ce colloque sur 

After it has been the basis for the article, to be published in the books Les outils de la Compliance and Compliance Tools in the Series Régulations & Compliance.

Read a general presentation of this book.  

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Summary of this Working Paper: Compliance and Incentives appear at first glance to be totally opposite. Not only because sanctions are at the heart of Compliance and that sanction is associated with constraint while incentive is associated with non-constrained!footnote-2044, but also because incentives are linked to self-regulation and that Compliance Law requires a strong presence of public authorities. Thus, one should choose: either Compliance or Incentives! Either the effectiveness of one or the effectiveness of the others; either the techniques of one, or the techniques of others; either the philosophy of one or the philosophy of the others. Resign yourself to the waste that such a necessary choice would involve. But putting the terms thus is thinking poorly about the situations and reducing the fields of the solutions which they call for. If we take a rich definition of Compliance Law, we can on the contrary articulate Compliance and Incentives.

To do this, the concept of “incentive Compliance” should be developed. This concept is not only appropriate, but it is necessary in a new conception of Sovereignty. For example for the digital Europe.

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Read the developments below. 

Full Reference : Frison-Roche, M.-A., Rights, primary and natural Compliance Tools, Working Paper, July  2020.

This Working paper is the basis for an article published in the collective book  Compliance Tools .

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There was a time when Regulatory techniques  were above all only calculations of the best tarifications, taken up by monopolistic companies, while Compliance techniques were only obedience to all rules governing us. All this could therefore only be business of abacus and badine, used by engineers and consisted only of mechanical reflexes of "conformity" to all kinds of rules with the corset ensuring that everyone is bent in front of them!footnote-1946. In the perspective of a Regulation and Compliance thus conceived, that is to say effective, it would not be necessary to insert prerogatives for people, since these could only be sources of inefficiency, of cost. and protest, where the order would come from figures set in advance and controlled processes.

Systems have since evolved to integrate these prerogatives of each person: rights. Is this evolution really acquired? Maybe more effectively in Regulation Law than in its extension which is Compliance Law. This may be surprising since Compliance Law, in that it extends Regulatory Law in enterprises should, on the contrary, promote rights by meeting the enterprise, which is a group of people ....!footnote-1986 . But the modern reluctance to define the enterprise (and the company) as a group of people and the preference given to a definition of the company (and the enterprise) as an "asset", a "good" of which investors would be the owners, maybe explains the sidelining of rights not only in Regulatory Law but also in Compliance Law even though it is being deployed in the space of the enterprise!footnote-1987.

In addition, if Regulation has long been the subject of a branch of Law in which rights have full place, the presentation of Compliance as "conformity", that is to say the proven assurance of obedience to all the applicable rules, leaves no space for the prerogatives of people, which appear rather as resistance to the obedience that would be expected of them. There again, the expectation of what would be a good ratio of conformity between behaviors and prescriptions would be obtained by a "design", data processing being the new form of calculation, improved by precision tools where the being human is not required!footnote-1989. His fallibility and the little confidence which one can place in him leads even to exclude the people and to conceive Compliance system between machines, not only to alert of the failures, but also to manufacture the "regulations" and to connect those. here, in a "regulatory fabric" without a jump stitch, entirely enveloping human beings!footnote-1990.

It would therefore be with regret, and probably because some constitutional jurisdictions still attach some value to fundamental rights that the systems of "conformity" of behavior to the rules make some room for the prerogatives of people, their more essential rights. It is sometimes said that this is part of the cost. It would therefore be as by "forcing" that rights would exist in Compliance systems, a kind of price that the effectiveness of Compliance must pay as a tribute to the Rule of Law principle!footnote-1991.

If in a poor definition Compliance is conceived in this only "conformity", leading to a landscape in which the behaviors of the people adjust to the rules governing the situations, Compliance being only the most "effective way" to ensure the application of the rules, in a mechanical perspective of Law, then it would effectively be necessary to reduce the prerogatives of people to a minimal part, because any "additional cost" is intended to disappear, even if it is produced here by constitutional requirements. In the looming battle between the effectiveness of the application of rules and the concern for the legal prerogatives of people who should above all obey and not claim their rights, especially their right not to obey , or their right to keep secret in Compliance techniques which is based on the centralization of information, the effectiveness of efficiency could only, by the very power of this tautology, prevail!footnote-1988... 

The defeat would not be total, however, collaboration would still be possible and active between people availing themselves of their rights and Compliance Law. Indeed, in many respects, if rights have been recognized in Compliance systems, it is not only because Compliance Law, like any branch of Law, can only be deployed with respect for fundamental rights. kept by fundamental legal texts, but also because of the effectiveness of rights as " Compliance Tools".

Indeed, because they constitute a very effective "tool" to ensure the entire functioning of a system whose goals are so difficult to achieve, because every effort must be made to achieve these goals, the public authorities not only rely on the power of crucial operators, but also distribute prerogatives to people who, thus encouraged, activate the Compliance system and participate in the achievement of the "monumental goals". Rights can prove to be the most effective tools to effectively achieve the goals set, to such an extent that they can be considered as "primary tools"  (I).

But it is necessary to be more ambitious, even to reverse the perspective. Indeed because all the Monumental Goals by which Compliance Law is defined can be reduced to the protection of people, that is to say to the effectiveness of their prerogatives, by a mirror effect between rights. given by Law to persons and the rights which constitute the very purpose of all Compliance Law, in particular the protection of all human beings, even if they are in a situation of great weakness, rights become a "natural tool" of Compliance Law (II).

Rights are the Compliance Law future.